Fachbereich 08 – Sozialwissenschaften
Bachelorstudiengang Integrierte Europastudien
8. Fachsemester

Gender Implications of the System Transformation in Russia

Critical Analysis of the Academic Discourse

von

Varvara Chinenova

Bachelorarbeit zur Erlangung
des akademischen Grades
***Bachelor of Arts* (B.A.)**
in Integrierten Europastudien

Gutachter*innen:

Dr. Jakob Fruchtmann, 1. Gutachter, Jacobs University

Dr. Sabine Ritter, 2. Gutachterin, Universität Bremen

Eingereicht von:
Varvara Chinenova
Matrikel-Nr: 3006183
Langemarckstr. 169
28199 Bremen
E-Mail: varvara@chinenova.com

To my mother.

Table of Contents

Introduction

The Soviet Union proclaimed to have created a new man and a new woman free from the shackles of capitalism; a man and a woman who were finally equal. Indeed, the Soviet era was marked by fundamental changes in gender politics: women were encouraged to get education, to work at factories, to drive tractors and to participate in politics. The state made it possible for women to enter the workforce by providing them with legal protection, state benefits and childcare services. However, at a family level, the female roles as mothers and housewives did not change in any significant way causing double and even triple burden for them.

With the Gorbachev era the Soviet Union started falling apart, transforming not only politics and economy but also the established gender order. On the one hand, glasnost and liberalization lifted the iron curtain, exposing Soviet men and women to the forbidden fruit of capitalism and consumerism, including western books and movies, beauty pageants, fashion magazines and pornography. On the other hand, the state proclaimed "new liberation of the woman", her liberation from the chains of work, her homecoming, her return to the primary "natural" role as a mother and a housewife.

The collapse of the Soviet Union plunged its people into the chaos of the transformation. Newly born Russia began to pave its own very special way to market economy and democracy. The country was suffocating from the financial crisis and hyperinflation. Russian government tried to stabilize the country often by taking random half-measures.

At that time of chaos, gender questions were rarely taken into consideration by the state as they were considered unimportant and secondary. Some sociologists, political scientists and economists, however, have been trying to keep track of and understand the changes Russian men and women underwent.

The aim of this work is to present a structured critical narrative of the theories and ideas which would explain what happened to Russian women and their role in society in that unsettling time of system transformation. However, considering the amount and variety of the literature analyzed, it is impossible to cover this topic exhaustively and elegantly connect all the ideas within the framework of a Bachelor thesis. For this reason, the focal point chosen for this paper is the introduction of capitalism and its implications on cultural, economic and political aspects of the transformation for women.

Hence, the question the present work addresses is: How can the introduction of capitalism explain the cultural, economic and political consequences of the system transformation for women?

The current paper begins with a description of methods and terminology used. Next, it covers the history of gender politics and women's rights in Russia from the beginning of the Soviet Union till the beginning of the transformation in order to introduce a general historical background. Then, the cultural implications of the transition for women are presented and the connections to the introduction of capitalism are described. Here, the author describes different aspects of the cultural changes that occurred during the post-communist transition. This includes an analysis of Russian culture with Hofstede's cultural categories, Orthodox renaissance, the notion of anomie and its effect on men and women in transition, contradictions connected with the "morality" of the new capitalist system, issues related to the sexualization of women, new gender contracts, and the problem of self-discrimination.

The following chapter is devoted to the introduction of capitalism and female labor. It explores a shift in people's attitude towards working women, problems with labor law, unemployment and the effects of work orientation. Furthermore, this chapter includes an analysis of the problems with new employment, promotion, starting a new business, income, and vertical and horizontal occupational gender segregation. Next, the roles of distribution of domestic labor as well as the change in socio-economic value of money are explained. This chapter finishes with the implications that networks and connections had for women on the economic and political levels.

The last chapter of this thesis explores the dynamics of political representation of women and explains the role of female social movements and organizations.

In the conclusion of the present work the author briefly summarizes the ideas presented and gives a subjective vision on the gender implications of the transformation through the prism of the introduction of capitalism.

Method and Definitions

In the current work, scientific literature which touches upon the period of transition in Russia from a gender perspective was analyzed. Some literature on the GDR and Eastern



Fig. 1: Introduction of capitalism in Russia. Gender implications.

European countries was taken into consideration as additional points of reference. The corpus of literature was in English, Russian and German, and included both quantitative and qualitative research. Though, the present literature review was meant to be as thorough as possible, it still might miss some relevant studies or points.

After having read a significant amount of literature, three main aspects of the transformation were singled out: economy, culture and politics. An attempt was then made to find a common denominator for these aspects, a point around which all other ideas could be structured. This is how the focal point of the introduction of capitalism was found and the following scheme was designed (see Figure 1)

This figure shows how cultural, economic and political consequences of the system transformation for women could be directly or indirectly connected to the introduction of capitalism in Russia. It is important to note that the depiction above as well as the current work do not cover *all* the consequences of the transition for women but only those that can be explained through the introduction of capitalism. This does not mean this factor was *the*

only one responsible for the changes described in this work; others played a role, though their study would go beyond the framework of this thesis. The connections shown in the figure will be explained in the following chapters of this paper. As the complexity and plurality of the interrelations between these different consequences on women does not allow for a linear narrative, the present work is instead structured around the three main aspects of the system transition: culture, economy and politics.

The transformation is defined in this thesis as a deep structural, economic, political and cultural changes that Russia underwent during its pro-communist transition to the market economy and democracy. Of course, there are different approaches and definitions of what the transformation is, where it begins and ends. There are scholars who might argue that Russia has yet to reach either market economy or democracy and that this process is still going on [Ericson, 2001]. In the thesis at hand the transformation is understood as the time between 1989 and 1998. The starting point is the time when the implications of Gorbachev's glasnost and the introduction of capitalism came into full effect and when the Soviet Union started falling apart irreversibly [Gaĭdar, 2003]. 1998 was chosen as the endpoint because, with the new elections in 1996 and the end of the privatization, it was the first time there was no chance of returning to the old system, to anything other than capitalism. By 1998, taking aside the crisis that happened that year, one can speak about relative stabilization of inflation, formation of prices and tax system [Gaĭdar, 2003; Aron, 2002].

Gender refers to those social, cultural and psychological traits linked to males and females through particular social contexts [Lindsey, 2015].

Gender roles are expected attitudes and behaviors a society associates with each sex [Lindsey, 2015].

Gender contract is a set of implicit and explicit rules governing gender relations, and which allocate different work, value, responsibilities and obligations to women and men. These rules are maintained on three levels: cultural superstructure (the norms and values of society); institutions (family welfare, education and employment systems, etc.); and socialization processes, notably in the family [European Commission, 1998].

The gender order is a patterned system of ideological and material practices, performed by individuals in a society, through which power relations between women and men are made, and remade, as meaningful. It is through the gender order of a society that forms or

codes of masculinities and femininities are created and recreated, and relations between them are organized [Pilcher and Whelehan, 2004].

Gender division of domestic labor is used to define marked differences between women and men in responsibilities for and preferences of the tasks necessary for daily living in a family household [Pilcher and Whelehan, 2004].

Gender schemas are gender status beliefs, as well as "schemas of devotion"—shared cultural models in relation to which individuals construct identities and meaning [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018].

History of Gender Politics: From Lenin to Yeltsin

In 1918 the equality of men and women was integrated into the first constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [Zavadskaya, 2001]. For Lenin, gender equality seemed to be an important part of communism. According to his contemporaries, he would repeatedly raise the "woman question". He said that women's social equality seemed to be the basis of communism, its indisputable part [Zetkin, 1925]. In 1920 Lenin gave an interview to Clara Zetkin where he talked about the necessity to create an international female movement on a clear and well-developed theoretical basis [Zetkin, 1925].

One of the most prominent women to develop this theoretical basis was Alexandra Kolontai. She was the world's first female minister and the world's first female diplomat; she played a significant role in theorizing the "woman question" in the USSR and in shaping Russian feminism in general. She advocated for women's social, economic and legal emancipation. Her main idea was that the state should assume the responsibilities of housework and childcare, liberating women from the home and giving them equal education and work opportunities. Motherhood, in her opinion, also had to be insured and protected by the state [Kollontay, 1923].

Thanks to Kolontai and other contributors, after the revolution a lot of dramatic changes were introduced to the legislation which gave women more freedoms: the legalization of abortion and of civil unions (which equaled the rights of children born in marriage and out of it), the introduction of maternity leave and the simplification of the divorce process [Ayvazova, 1998].

However, by 1930 the birth rate had plummeted, which prompted the government to review family politics and return to a pronatalist approach. In 1935 contraceptives were no longer sold, and in 1936 abortions were banned and the divorce process was made more complicated. At the same time, the state established benefits for nursing mothers, boosted financial aid for multi-child households and increased the number of birth centers. In 1936 a constitution was signed closing the "woman question" as solved. From that point on, all social initiatives could come from the state only, thus forbidding independent women's organizations [Pushkareva, 2014; Ayvazova, 1998].

By 1944 divorces could be issued only by a court decision and civil unions stopped being supported by the state [Pushkareva, 2014]. Motherhood counted as a social duty for a woman which, in combination with obligatory participation in the workforce, created a phenomenon of double burden [Lapidus, 1978 (1979]. However, at that time the problem of double burden was not raised in society and it was just considered a "normal" part of female life.

In 1943 gender segregation of education was introduced to prepare boys and girls for their different roles in society: boys as soldiers, and girls as mothers and caretakers. During the Second World War many women occupied prominent positions at state enterprises; however, they were forced to leave their posts once the war ended [Ayvazova, 1998].

After Stalin's death the politics concerning women changed yet again. During the Khrushchev Thaw (from the early 1950s to the early 1960s) a number of important legal decisions concerning women and the family that had been introduced under Stalin were reversed. Education reforms in 1954 returned to mixed schooling, in 1955 abortions were once again legal, and in 1965 the divorce process was simplified. Women were encouraged to actively participate in the building of the "bright communist future" [Pushkareva, 2014].

In 1963 Valentina Tereshkova became the first woman to fly into outer space and this became a matter of national pride in the USSR. Khrushchev himself used her example to demonstrate gender equality in the Soviet Union [Ghosh, 17.09.2015].

At the same time, due to the demographic losses of the Second World War, Khrushchev put a considerable emphasis on the health and welfare of women, especially their reproductive rights and maternal responsibilities [Pushkareva, 2014].

Leonid Brezhnev continued Khrushchev's gender politics focusing on demographic growth and the protection of the family, especially women and their role as working

mothers. In 1968 women were paid maternity leaves and birth benefits as well as benefits for single mothers and divorced women. New laws improved the status of women but did not solve the problem of domestic inequality or discrimination at work. The female gender contract of that time was "working mother" which still presupposed that a woman carries the whole burden of the household. In the same year, the new Fundamental Principles of Legislation of the Soviet Union and Union Republics on Marriage and the Family were introduced. This document emphasized the importance of equality between men and women as well as the importance of providing social support to the women that would enable them to participate more actively in social and political life [Pushkareva, 2014].

One can see that Russian legislation has always been controversial regarding gender question: on the one hand it promoted gender equality, on the other it still defined women mostly through their reproductive function. That said when the law mentioned mothers it presupposed that they were the ones to take care of children. So, a mother was not just one of the parents, she was the parent with all the responsibilities and consequences that follow. The Russian State in its attempts to protect all women as potential mothers often just perpetuated the traditional gender roles and thus inequality, by labeling men as inadequate parents and women as inadequate workers. This paradox of Russian legislation was also reflected in the constitution of 1977 which proclaimed that "women and men have equal rights in the USSR" and at the same time gave women with small children special benefits to work fewer hours or to take paid leaves [Ayvazova, 1998].

Another good example of discriminatory legislation that was supposed to benefit women was a list of forbidden occupations for women introduced in 1974. It was supposed to protect regenerative health of women, partially as a means to fight the demographic crisis [Gottesfeld, 1992]. This, however, did not change the fact that many women kept working in hazardous conditions for miserable pay.

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, gender politics took another turn in in the mid-1980s with the Gorbachev's era. He admitted many misconceptions of communism, one of which he considered the role of women [Racioppi, 1995]. Gorbachev's position is well summarized in the following quote:

> "Over the years . . . we failed to pay attention to women's specific rights and needs arising from their role as mother and homemaker, and their indispensable educational function as regards children. Engaged in scientific research, working on construction

> sites, in production and involved in creative activities, women no longer have enough time to perform their everyday duties at home — housework, the upbringing of children and the creation of a good family atmosphere. We have discovered that many of our problems — in children's and young people's behavior, in our morals, culture and in production — are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and slack attitude to family responsibilities. This is a paradoxical result of our sincere and politically justified desire to make women equal to men in everything. Now in the course of Perestroika, we have begun to overcome this shortcoming. That is why we are now holding heated debates in the press, in public organizations, at work and at home, about the question of what we should do to make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission." (Gorbachev [1987])

The return of women "to their purely womanly mission" was called a "new liberation of women" — the liberation from emancipation. This approach, in combination with the demographic crisis of the late period of the Soviet Union, led to the rise of family propaganda. The media also promoted self-sacrifice as the highest expression of femininity [Bridger et al., 1996]. In other words, women under communism were assigned the roles of workers and mothers and under Perestroika they were reassigned the roles of mothers and homemakers.

At the same time, women faced numerous problems concerning their working conditions. In July 1987 the National Women Congress took place in Moscow, where Valentina Tereshkova, invited as one of the main speakers, pointed out the problems faced by Russian women, such as the widespread involvement of women in heavy physical work, often in dangerous conditions despite the legislation. Unfortunately, Tereshkova's word made no major impact on the situation [FZH].

Boris Yeltsin became the new Russian leader after Gorbachev and introduced several radical economic and political reforms; his position on women, however, was not that different from that of his predecessor. Being a nationalist, he naturally saw women as mothers and keepers of the nation's values. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin gave an interview to Rabotnitsa, a very popular women's magazine at the time, in which he claimed that "mother, child and family have always come first for the people in Russia" [Bridger et al., 1996]. Many of his policies, however, were in many ways disastrous for Russian women, as can be clearly seen in the following chapters.

1 Culture

1.1 Russian Culture Explained in Hofstede's Dimensions

Not only had the Soviet past shaped the country's economic, political and legal systems, but it had also established certain features of the culture and mentality which predetermined the formation of gender relations during the transition. That is why, to begin with, general features of Russian culture will be described as a context for the transformation. In this thesis a culture is defined as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others" [Hofstede, 2011]. Among other possible theoretical categorizations, the six cultural dimensions by Hofstede and Minkov are particularly adequate and comprehensive as a means of describing the particularities of Russian culture [Hofstede et al., 2010]. The dimensions are defined as follows:

1. **Power Distance** is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from above.

2. **Uncertainty Avoidance** deals with a society's tolerance for ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Uncertainty-avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations through strict behavioral codes, laws and rules, disapproval of deviant opinions, and a belief in absolute Truth.

3. **Individualism** versus **Collectivism**, related to the integration of individuals into primary groups. On the individualist side we find cultures in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him/herself and his/her immediate family. On the collectivist side we find cultures in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families that continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty and opposition to other in-groups.

4. **Masculinity** versus **Femininity**. A society is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest,

tender, and concerned with the quality of life. A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

5. **Long Term** versus **Short Term** Orientation is related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or the present and past.

6. **Indulgence** versus **Restraint** is related to the gratification versus control of basic human desires related to enjoying life. Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that controls the gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms.

Hofstede in his research comes to the conclusion that Russian culture is defined by large power distance, collectivism, strong uncertainty avoidance, femininity, long-term orientation and restraint [Hofstede, 1998; Hofstede et al., 2010].

However, it is important to understand that these dimensions define a spectrum. If one takes, for example, the category most relevant to this work, the one that deals with gender, i.e. masculinity vs. femininity, one can see that according to Hofstede's measurements Russia is a rather feminine culture with a masculinity index 40/100 [Hofstede, 1998]. Nevertheless, one could argue that Russia does not fully fit the main features of femininity defined by Hofstede (see Table 1). Highlighted are the features that the author of the present work would definitely ascribe to Russian culture. So, it is possible that there are some ambiguities in Hofstede's methodology.

There are indeed some alternative measurements according to which in the mid-90s Russia had a moderate score in masculinity (55/100) [Naumov and Puffer, 2000].

Despite all possible variations, Hofstede's categories not only give us a general sense of Russian culture, but they could also be used to explain gender dynamics during the transformation. One such attempt was made by Laura Riolli-Saltzman and Victor Savicki, who argued that the reluctance of Russian women to resist oppression on an individual level in the post-Soviet era was a consequence of collectivism [Riolli-Saltzman and Savicki, 2003]. The authors explain that if a society regards equality as needless, this equality would be viewed as unpatriotic and hence not allowed. High uncertainty avoidance can facilitate gender equality if regulations exist that legitimize it. If there are none, people may fall back

Table 1: Ten Differences Between Feminine and Masculine Societies

Masculinity	**Femininity**
Maximum emotional and social role differentiation between the genders	Minimum emotional and social role differentiation between the genders
Men should be and women may be assertive and ambitious	Men and women should be modest and caring
Work prevails over family	Balance between family and work
Admiration for the strong	Sympathy for the weak
Fathers deal with facts, mothers with feelings	Both fathers and mothers deal with facts and feelings
Girls cry, boys do not; boys should fight back, girls should not fight	Both boys and girls may cry but neither should fight
Fathers decide on family size	Mothers decide on number of children
Few women in elected political positions	Many women in elected political positions
Religion focuses on God or gods	Religion focuses on fellow human beings
Moralistic attitudes about sexuality; sex is a way of performing	Matter-of-fact attitudes about sexuality; sex is a way of relating

upon traditional rules and rituals concerning the genders (as it happened in Russia). High education levels that stayed constant even during the 90s can also be attributed to a high uncertainty avoidance culture and strong accent on expertise. Riolli-Saltzman and Savicki follow Adler's definition of masculine and feminine culture [Adler, 1997].The authors define masculinity as the focus on career success and femininity as the focus on the quality of life. The authors' findings categorize Russia as a feminine culture, but they point out the paradox that women are so widely discriminated against in a country which, in theory, should make women's life easier. Riolli-Saltzman and Savicki explain this inconsistency by the lack of economic development in the country which limits the opportunities for women [Riolli-Saltzman and Savicki, 2003].

What is important in this theory is that it could explain how in the conditions of economic crisis, the collectivism and uncertainty-avoidance of Russian culture could cause the renaissance of traditional, pre-communist/bourgeois values during the transition, that so many authors talk about [Aslanbeigui et al., 1994; Ayvazova, 1998; Bertaux et al., 2004;

Funk and Mueller, 1993]. In the present work this relapse is regarded as one of the main factors that influenced gender inequality during that period.

1.2 Back to Church

One of the most obvious examples of the return to pre-Soviet values is the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church started gaining social and political influence during the transformation, thus reinforcing patriarchal tendencies in the new era [Kizenko, 2013].

Like almost any other religion, Orthodox Christianity promotes women as subordinate to men; a woman's main purpose is to be a mother and a good wife, to satisfy the needs of her husband and to be humble, modest and obedient. More than that, the Orthodox Church had been constantly persecuted and restricted by the communist government, which meant that it missed the moment of change toward women's greater participation in church life experienced by Western Christianity. With the fall of the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church rejected Soviet-Era rhetoric as well as Western liberalism, shifting towards intensifying traditional gender roles as a cure to Russia's troubles [Kizenko, 2013]. Therefore, patriarchy became a moral norm promoted by the Church. At the time of transformation, it started gaining not only the status of a moral compass for the nation but also increased its political influence, especially in questions of sexuality and female reproduction.

Another reason for the revival of Orthodoxy in Russia was the cultural and ideological vacuum that the introduction of capitalism brought with it. In the post-Soviet Era, the majority of Russians started identifying themselves as religious, probably as a protest against the previously-imposed atheist ideology [Mitrokhin, 1994]. It led to the fact that religiosity and being Orthodox started overlapping with national identity [Borowik, 2016]. Nowadays it is considered by many Russians (including Putin) to be a defining feature of Russian culture, meaning that patriarchy still remains in the center of Russian cultural values.

However, the Church could not completely make up for the disappearance of the communist ideology, so many people found themselves puzzled and bewildered about what social norms should be accepted in that new reality.

1.3 Anomie: Female Survivors and Male Casualties

Many authors agree that the collapse of the Soviet Union provoked an identity crisis in both men and women that in turn caused a crisis in social development [Domsch et al., 2003; Buckley, 1997; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002; Funk and Mueller, 1993; Lytkina and Ashwin, 2004]. The transition to capitalism was marked by anomie, or normlessness, which means a breakup of old forms of social organization without their being replaced by appropriate new forms [Lindsey, 2015].

Durkheim believed that anomie is a byproduct of a rapid social change [Durkheim, 1897] Numerous studies on anomie show that it is an independent factor predicting such deviant behavior as suicide and crime [Bjarnason et al., 2005; Clinard, 1964; Durkheim, 1897; Merton, 1938; Thorlindsson and Bernburg, 2004]. Rapid socio-political changes in Russia, i.e. the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy and social inequality, are seen as important sources of anomie [Zhao and Cao, 2010].

The research shows that males, the young, the unmarried and the unemployed are more anomic than females, the older, the married and the employed. In addition, the more family savings an individual has, the less anomic he or she is, and the more confidence an individual has in authority (the police, the legal system and the government), the less anomic he or she is [Zhao and Cao, 2010].

This theory may explain the rise of crime and other deviant behavior in Russia during the transformation [Pridemore et al., 2007]: the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 left a power vacuum; the institutions necessary to execute democratically-taken decisions were missing, and the local mafia filled this vacuum by establishing a kleptocracy (government by thieves).

Anomie could also explain Sarah Ashwin's findings on the general lack of adaptability in Russian men in the period of transition [Ashwin, 2006]. She argues in her book that for a man it was more difficult to adapt to the changes because of his social contract of a strong breadwinner. In her qualitative study, Ashwin demonstrates that men in times of crisis have been less flexible in their occupation preferences than women. She claims that the high numbers of suicides, alcoholism and drug abuse among men in the transition prove their inferior ability to adapt. Ashwin shows that men became polarized, between those at the bottom who suffered demoralization and early death, and those who dominated the market, the so-called New Russians. Due to the sole social contract of breadwinners

(see Section 1.6), men's withdrawal from the labor market was problematic. Ashwin suggests that the failure to earn money or to be a "real man" involved worse consequences for men because women were not seen primarily as breadwinners and had a greater variety of occupations that did not challenge their identity, meaning that their failures at work produced less psychological distress. During the period of transition male life expectancy dropped from 64.2 in 1989 to as low as 57.5 in 1994. A study estimated that alcohol consumption directly or indirectly caused around 33% of male deaths in 1994. A link between alcohol consumption and unemployment was found in men, but not in women. Ashwin sees women as "heroic survivors of the transition" and men as its "primary casualties" [Ashwin, 2006].

1.4 Rotten West and Morality of Capitalism

The cultural and ideological vacuum, and the state of normlessness it led to, was also reflected in people's attitudes towards capitalism in general. Once hated and condemned, it became the new reality for the country, causing a collective cognitive dissonance [Pridemore et al., 2007].

Russia has always had a rivalry relationship with the West, i.e. Germany, France and the UK, though most often this concept boiled down to the USA. "The West" was employed in Soviet discourse (especially from the late 1920s onwards) as a *repository of social ills*. These tensions were exacerbated during the Cold War and continued after its end. However, Russians had (and still have) a paradoxical love-hate attitude towards 'the West'. In the Soviet Union people craved American products and envied the "western" way of life while, at the same time, they saw the USA as their main rival and enemy, mocked it and considered it morally deviant, rotten with consumerism [Bonnett, 2016].

Nevertheless, the fall of the USSR was marked by the rise of that very consumerism that had once been so condemned, and the country started moving towards individualistic values [Kharkhordin, 2002]. In this light, the importance of the private sphere began to grow rapidly. In the Soviet Union this sphere was quite limited as many people had to live in communal flats until the situation started to change. The private sphere grew into the space that temporary protected an individual from the state, the hardships of economic crisis and the public sphere in general [Zdravomyslova et al., 2009]. Moreover, the rejection of Soviet values, as well as the associated minimalism and consumer shortages, at times led to

the effect of demonstrative consumption, which would emphasize the differences between people's incomes and social statuses. For this reason, the decoration and furnishing of one's home in an individual manner often became a matter of personal pride. If people could afford a private house they would, as a rule, also build a massive fence around it to literally isolate their private sphere from the outside world [Zdravomyslova et al., 2009].

Despite the growing influence of western consumerism in the post-Soviet Era, Russian nationalism was still very strong and targeted women as the protectors of Russian culture and educators of new generations. This, by the way, was not a particularity of the Russian mentality, but rather a general feature of nationalism, in which a woman is a mother of the nation, who preserves purity, traditions and its "soul." [McClintock, 1993; McClintock et al., 1997; Yuval-Davis et al., 1989]. For this reason, a growing number of women who were dating western foreigners or hunting for a western husband were admired on the one hand and seen as morally deviant on the other.

Likewise, many were uncomfortable with the idea of street trade—one of the most common occupations for post-Soviet women—because it had been illegal and shameful in the USSR. Back then it had often been referred to as *spekuliatsia*, or black market trading and was associated with western capitalism. Many women involved in it often felt ashamed and looked down upon by society during the first years of the transformation [Bridger et al., 1996].

1.5 Sexualization of Women and Gender Violence

Undoubtedly, anomie also had a tangible effect on the realm of sexuality. The sexual liberation that had begun during the Gorbachev era brought a lot of confusion to Russian people for whom sex had been taboo for so many years. Men and women were often unable to tell between liberalization and exploitation. Russian society, suddenly exposed to explicit sexuality, had problems distinguishing the boundaries between erotic photography, modeling, pornography and prostitution [Johnson, 2009].

A good example is the emergence of the beauty and fashion industry, because of which the pressure to look good started to grow. The first fashion magazines, beauty pageants and model agencies started filling a starving market. The first fashion event to have major coverage was the Miss Moscow contest of 1988, after which similar events mushroomed all over the country. The growing concept of femininity could be seen as a way to deny

Soviet ideology, which had allegedly been killing femininity in women. Therefore, beauty pageants were not just about demonstrating beauty but also about being acknowledged as "a good person and a good woman" [Bridger et al., 1996]. Unfortunately, beauty pageants as well as model agencies became infamous for forcing women to have sex with numerous men: organizers, judges, sponsors, photographers and so on. Fake model agencies would hire girls as models and send them abroad to be forced into prostitution or pornography [Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002]

In the 90s the market for erotica and pornography exploded and people (mostly men), for whom the subject of sex had been taboo for a long time, started consuming erotica and porn en masse [Johnson, 2009; Pilkington, 1996]. The content of most pornographic and erotic materials was demeaning to women, which might be one of the reasons for the rise in sexual violence against women in this period [Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002; Lissyutkina, 1993; Buckley, 1997; Bridger et al., 1996; Johnson, 2009; Pilkington, 1996]. At the same time, despite the sexual liberation, there was still no sex education, so the rates of sexually transmitted diseases also went up [Bertaux et al., 2004; Kon and Riordan, 1993].

Starting from the mid-80s, the Soviet media increasingly brought up discussions about sex, displaying nudity and erotic imagery encouraging the sexual exploitation and abuse of women, not only in the sex industry but also beyond it.

Around the same period, the commercialization of female bodies made its way to the Soviet Union, so "sexy ladies" were now to be found not only in porn, but literally everywhere, promoting all types of products [Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002; Pilkington, 1996] This commercialization of female bodies had two main aspects to it. First, due to income inequality men, as a rule, had a higher "spending capacity", hence the advertising of goods was aimed at them, and, in this case, female bodies became marketing tools. Second, once again, due to the income inequality, which in the capitalist world turned into social power inequality, women would regard themselves and their bodies as "goods" to be sold as expensively as possible.

In this connection, prostitution became widespread and visible, especially in bigger cities, with call-girl agencies advertising freely in the press. The threat of unemployment and a growing demand for sex-workers forced many women desperate for money into prostitution to survive [Pilkington, 1996; Bridger et al., 1996; Johnson, 2009]. It is important to understand that this occupation was extremely risky and dangerous at that time. It was

mostly controlled by organized criminal groups and involved high levels of abuse [Barsukova, 1999]. By choosing this path women were completely losing control over their lives. Still, many accepted the risks because prostitution was often referred to as the only way for women to make a good amount of money. A certain degree of rationalization of this profession was observed, especially among the younger generation [Lissyutkina, 1993; Johnson, 2009]. Marriages for money, or being a mistress of a rich man, which are both sometimes referred to as "hidden prostitution", have been seen by some authors as a female survival and adaptation strategy [Pilkington, 1996; Bridger et al., 1996]. With shrinking possibilities to earn money and constant discrimination in employment, there is little wonder that many women opted for it. At the same time, the emergence of many rich and super-rich men created a big demand for such women. Newspapers in that period were full of advertisements regarding well-off men looking for "*pleasant company*", while many female newspaper advertisements of all kinds (be it selling a refrigerator or looking for a job as a teacher) ended with the words: "Not interested in sex services" [Bridger et al., 1996].[1] Numerous authors report that sexual harassment was also extremely widespread and often normalized at that time, which could hinder women from getting a new job, keeping an old one or getting a promotion [Horne, 1999; Bridger et al., 1996; Domsch et al., 2003; Pilkington, 1996; Johnson, 2009].

Television at that time became the dominant medium not only of information, but also of entertainment. Female Russian mainstream entertainment personas and TV hosts became explicitly "sexy," wearing heavy make-up, high heels and deep cleavage, promoting an image of exaggerated femininity. Another phenomenon that is interesting to take into account in this regard is Estrada. Estrada is a from of popular entertainment which can include music, dance, circus and comedy. In Russia and the USSR the notion of Estrada often refers to a closed group of people whose performances are transmitted exclusively on state television. They are so-called "state artists" whose work is approved by the government. Even today, Estrada remains an influential phenomenon and important cultural realia. It has always been extremely popular and reflects the Russian Zeitgeist.[2] It can be clearly seen that starting from the 90s, Estrada promoted an image of women

[1] A detailed analysis of newspaper advertisements of the period of transition from a gender perspective could be promising material for future research.

[2] Unfortunately, the author has not found studies analyzing the changes in Russian Estrada and its expression, content and language from a gender perspective, but it would be an exciting study to conduct.

as sex objects through corresponding song lyrics, which was clearly not the case in the 70s-early 80s. In the time of transformation many people turned to TV stars to escape the unfortunate reality of crisis, and the images promoted by Estrada might have played a tangible role in encouraging the objectification of women.

1.6 New Gender Contracts

The shift in attitudes towards sexuality, together with the change in the socio-economic value of money and the implications of anomie, became the forming powers for new gender contracts [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002]. The Soviet gender order was formed by the state party, but there was a constant gap between the official ideology and everyday experiences. The dominant gender contract for women in the USSR was that of "working mothers."

Working Mother Contract A Soviet woman worked full-time, organized the household and was involved in her children's upbringing, partially sharing this task with (female) relatives and state institutions. This model is also sometimes referred to as the triple burden [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002]. The ideological female gender contract was different from its real-life implementations. Officially, state politics, ideology and social institutions were supposed to help women combine work and family responsibilities. In real life, however, the female gender contract presupposed that a woman bears full responsibility for children, the elderly and the household, compensating for the limitations of social services and state deficiency [Nartova, 2008].

In the end of the 80s the changes in Soviet society caused a transformation of gender relations. The state lost its role in forming gender contracts and the systems of social and ideological support of motherhood started to fall apart. Market mechanisms and a liberal social sphere encouraged the differentiation of gender norms and experiences in various social strata, forming new, often contradicting gender ideologies and interpretations of femininity. The reconfiguration of official gender roles caused the shaping of new gender contracts.

In the period of transition, "working mothers" did not disappear, due to economic needs: most families could not survive in times of crisis with only one spouse working. The "working mothers" contract was directly inherited from the Soviet Union and has remained the dominant contract of the post-Soviet period. Obligatory participation in the workforce

was replaced by an economic necessity to work. This change applied to both single mothers and families with two earners [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002].

New gender relations were defined by a so-called "patriarchal renaissance", meaning that men were getting the dominant positions and women were forced into the private sphere [Buckley, 1997]. "Working mothers" became a basis for forming new contracts, i.e. a "housewife", a "career woman", and a "mistress" (or a "sponsee contract") [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002].

Career Woman Contract In the new market conditions, some women became the dominant or sole breadwinners, with a main interest in work. The household and raising children then became a matter of negotiation with relatives or wage workers (mostly females) as well as involving commercial (paid) healthcare and educational institutions. However, if women from this group intentionally decided to go child-free, they ran the risk of being stigmatized and marginalized, as fertility was still the defining feature of a "good" woman [Nartova, 2008]. In spite of their professional orientation, career women still kept the responsibility over running the household.

Mistress/Sponsee Contract Market mechanisms made sexuality a product that could be bought, sold or exchanged, something that found its expression in the mistress/sponsee contract. This contract presupposes that a man becomes a dominant agent who has power and financial resources to provide for a sexually attractive woman (more in Section 1.5). This power dynamic, based on men "buying" time with a woman, often led to the social justification of domestic violence. In a capitalist world money brings absolute power and social significance, so a woman who is provided for becomes a sort of product and her body becomes the "property" of a provider, where the decision of whether or not to abuse it is up to him.

Housewife Contract Post-Soviet society distanced itself from gender equality while at the same time keeping Soviet values of home and family, which prompted Russian society to embrace some western-type gender relations. However, western values and lifestyles were accepted only if they coincided with the ideals of the late Soviet period. It was certainly the case with the new female role of bourgeois housewife, i.e. an image of a stay-at-home woman from the "civilized" (western) world provided by a well-off husband. The

new gender policy of the Russian state was to return women home, so service, motherhood and care became the essence of female identity. Besides, it also included sexual appeal, which, according to some authors, was part of the shadow/illegitimate contracts in the Soviet Union [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002].

Male Breadwinner Contract The dominant male gender contract remained that of the main breadwinner, and it often formed employers' decisions regarding pay levels and promotions [Ashwin, 2006].

In this concern, Sarah Ashwin argues that male obligation as primary earners prompted them to be more active on the labor market; for example, it forced men to take an additional job when women would seldom do it. The level of pay men were ready to accept was also dictated by their presumed role of main breadwinner. The only limit for men's employment was the status of this employment. Certain professions were perceived by men as being beneath their dignity, thus their self-respect can be seen as their main limiting factor [Ashwin, 2006]. Failure to fulfill the breadwinner contract because of the new market conditions led to a so-called masculinity crisis, in which a man was marginalized in both the private and public spheres [Zdravomyslova and Temkina, 2003] (see Section 1.3) In this concern a conclusion can be made that men who had only one contract to stick to had a higher risk of being rejected by society than women.

1.7 Self-Discrimination

The changes that gender contracts underwent made it possible for women to "choose" to what extent they wanted to participate in paid labor. No doubt that this choice was preconditioned by many external factors, such as the economic and educational background of women and the presence or absence of useful connections. At the same time, there was one influential internalized factor that would often prevent women from fulfilling their economic potential – self-discrimination. This phenomenon is very common all over the world and is largely connected to the process of socialization [Steffens and Viladot, 2015]. For example, if a female was brought up with the idea that a proper woman should be a mother, she would not only reproduce this belief but would also become part of the social control mechanism: for instance, by shaming or marginalizing childless women. In the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia, the future roles of mothers and housewives were -

and are still - emphasized to girls from an early age. The educational system taught them to obey rather than to take initiative. As a result, women lacked self-confidence, which was essential for the new economic and political situation.

In the private sphere, Russian women would voluntarily take up the second burden of the household even when it was avoidable. In several studies women were found to disapprove of male attempts to take on "female" household tasks [Lytkina and Ashwin, 2004; Ashwin, 2006]. Some women were taking responsibility for sick relatives as the only choice available; they would sacrifice their salaries to take on their female responsibility as caregivers. Females were also found to do most of the housework, whatever the breadwinning arrangements of the household may have been [Ashwin, 2006].

Reading through numerous interviews with Russian women the author of the present work could not help noticing that a lot of them did not connect their financial problems and problems with employment to the patriarchal structures of Russian society. In terms of employment, women would often sort themselves into "gender-appropriate" areas. Besides, many women thought that they were inferior workers, so they were more likely to accept a low-status job or lower pay [Ashwin, 2006; Kay, 2007]. According to the RLMS data[3], more than half (54%) of the females believed that they did not have enough qualities valued in the existing economic situation. As for the males, only, 45% of them thought that they lacked valuable qualities [Mezentseva, 2005].

Many women tended to accept and justify sexism as a normal part of their life; they did not recognize the situation they faced during the transition as discrimination, and even more than that some rationalized the unequal access to jobs based on gender. Following the line of the gender politics of that time, some women even questioned the very necessity for women to work in the new capitalist world.

[3]The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey - Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE) is a series of nationally representative surveys designed to monitor the effects of Russian reforms on the health and economic welfare of households and individuals in the Russian Federation.

2 Women and Work

2.1 Should Women Work?

The housewife contract was widely promoted by mainstream media and politicians as the new reality for women. Economic crisis which led to the state of cultural anomie and the renaissance of traditional values made people, including some women, question whether females should be part of the labor market at all. The idea was to provide the few available positions to men, considered the primary breadwinners, while bringing women back to domestic tasks and childcare [Bridger et al., 1996]. With the vanishing system of social care, even working women were forced to commit to their roles as mothers and housewives.

Women were also growingly seen as responsible for taking care of men, and not fulfilling this duty was seen unnatural. Many men as well as women assumed that if a man was supported by a caring wife and had a stable home life he would be efficient at work, earn lots of money and would not drink or take drugs. Thus, it was (and still is) common to blame a woman for the failures of her husband. Voluntarily single women were thus seen as deviant and women with successful careers had to emphasize the importance of their family life to be accepted by society [Ashwin, 2006].

Nevertheless, women could not be eliminated from the workforce not only because they comprised half of it but also because many female jobs were unappealing to men due to their low wages and status. Moreover, women were more likely to do unpaid extra work, stay longer hours and were less likely to ask for a raise or promotion [Bridger et al., 1996] The reality of the transition period was that most families still required two incomes to live with some degree of comfort. Thus, most women could neither afford staying at home nor did they really want to. Numerous sociological surveys show that the majority of Russian women did want to work and not only out of necessity [Bridger et al., 1996; Ashwin, 2006; Buckley, 1997]. Work had become a crucial part of their self-identity, even when the work was hard and unpleasant. As a result, many women stuck to the Soviet contract of working mothers and its double-burden.

It is still important to note that in the times of transformation there were mixed opinions on the role of women in this new reality. Even Gorbachev himself was first emphasizing how crucial it was “to return women to their womanly mission” while speaking about

"opening up a wide road" for women in government posts. This paradox reflects the conflict between Soviet ideology and the increasingly naturalistic views on men and women. Mixed legacy and the double standards were clearly reflected in the development of the labor law during the transition.

2.2 Labor Law Transition

In 1988, at the 19th Party Conference, Zoya Pukhova, the head of the Soviet Women's Committee, talked about the dangers that perestroika could bring to women. She argued that the benefits that women entitled to in terms of part-time, flexible or additional leaves would make them undesirable members of the workforce. Pukhova was not heard and the inconsistency in the late Soviet and early Russian legislation towards women indeed harmed the latter [Filtzer, 1994]. Despite the proclaimed gender equality, childcare had always been a woman's task in Soviet Russia. The government was focusing on creating state services that could help working mothers rather than involving men in childcare or housework. Besides, in the new economic conditions private companies became responsible for providing the benefits for their employees and they had no adequate help from the government to compensate for the losses in profit or productivity. Furthermore, pregnant women and women with children under three were forbidden from doing overtime, working night shifts or going on business trips even if they wanted to do so. Ironically, post-Soviet labor laws were the main reason why employers had less and less incentives to hire women, as the legislation protected them as "special" workers [Kay, 2002; Ashwin, 2006].

Other "protective" laws that were inherited from the Soviet Union limited women's ability to freely choose a job, even though article 5 of the 1991 law *On the Employment of the Population of the Russian Federation* guaranteed citizens a free choice of employment irrespective of sex and age [Trudovoi Kodeks RF, 1991]. Since the Soviet Era there existed a list of so-called *Dangerous and Harmful Jobs* which banned women from numerous occupations. By January 1981, 460 occupations, mostly those presupposing physical work in the construction, chemical and metal branches as well as driving large vehicles, were banned to women because such jobs were hazardous to their reproductive health [Human Rights Watch, 1995].

Women were discriminated against in legislation not only because of their ability to give birth but also because of their assumed primary roles as mothers. For example, from

January 1991 any family member had a right to stay home with a child under the age of three. However, the right to apply for part-time work was restricted to women only and lasted until the child turned fourteen. There was even an attempt to pass a bill that would establish a norm of part-time work for women by requiring any woman with a child under the age of fourteen to work no more than thirty-five hours per week. Luckily the bill was never passed because of the dissolution of parliament in September 1993 [Ashwin, 2006].

Much of the abovementioned protective legislation prevented women from competing on an equal basis on the labor market and perpetuated the stereotype of women as unreliable and inefficient workers.

Another problem with Russian labor legislation during the transformation was the systematic failure in its enforcement. Russia adopted the International Labor Organization (hereafter ILO) conventions signed by the Soviet Union: *on Equal Pay for Men and Women, on Discrimination and on Employment Policy* that were supposed to protect women from discrimination at work [International Labour Organisation, 1981]. The Soviet Labor Code (which existed until 2001) also contained a list of rights and benefits for women that had to be provided by employers [Ashwin, 2006; Bridger et al., 1996]. In reality, labor legislation could be largely ignored if convenient to the management and no larger effort was made by the authorities to punish or prevent it [Kay, 2002; Ashwin, 2006].

There were numerous reports of employers explicitly demanding their employees not to get sick or pregnant in order to keep their job. Those who became pregnant often faced an instant dismissal. These direct violations of labor laws were more common in the private sector than in the former state and budget sectors which followed the letter of the law more closely. In addition, even though, according to the law, both parents could take a parental or sick leave if a child was sick, it was primarily mothers who would do so, because of the presumed gender roles. Employers would assume that as well, which manifested in asking women but never men about having young children or wanting to have them [Kay, 2002; Ashwin, 2006; Corrin, 1992].

Overall, many authors came to the same conclusion that women were more vulnerable to discrimination during the transformation compared to the Soviet Era [Hendley, 1996; Ashwin, 2006]. Back then, victims of discrimination had the possibility to complain to the Party. In line with its communist ideology, the Soviet state had female quotas and promoted the idea of egalitarianism by ensuring female employment [Pascall and Manning,

2000]. With the fall of the Soviet Union this ideology disappeared as well, leaving no female quotas or other forms of state-enforced anti-discrimination measures, which put women under a greater risk of unemployment.

2.3 Unemployment

Post-Soviet Russia was in a deep economic crisis during its first years and many people who had never experienced unemployment in their lives had to go through this demoralizing experience. Early studies mostly claimed that unemployment in Russia had a "*female face*", i.e. that women disproportionately suffered from redundancies. Most of the authors quoted the ratio 70:30 female:male among the unemployed [Ashwin and Bowers, 1997; Kay and Bridger, 1996; Buckley, 1997; Khotkina, 2003]. Some even argued that up to 75-80% of the unemployed were female [Pilkington, 1992; Bridger et al., 1996]. Most women made redundant were believed to have a higher education [Kay and Bridger, 1996; Buckley, 1997]. Zoya Khotkina, for example, wrote that:

> "Women with a high level of education accounted for about 70 percent of the unemployed with higher education in the first wave of dismissals in 1992-1994 and were mostly engineers, economists and researchers. Two branches of economy had the biggest reductions in the period from 1990 till 1998 - Industry and Science, in which a lot of educated women were employed (54% of all engineers in the Soviet period were women)." (Khotkina [2003])

Later research refers to the aforementioned ideas as myths and misconceptions that appeared due to particularities of Russian unemployment [Gerber and Mayorova, 2006; Ashwin, 2006; Roshin, 2005; Mezentseva, 2005; Tatakovskaya, 2000]. First of all, not all of the unemployed were registered as the procedure was time-taking and the benefits were low. Several authors mention that women were more likely to officially register as unemployed because they were used to getting benefits from the state and it was not degrading to their status. [Ashwin, 2006; Roshin, 2005; Mezentseva, 2005]. The second problem concerns the fact that many worked unregistered and in official statistics such people could not be accounted for.

The latter issue is also known as hidden unemployment [Bridger et al., 1996; Kay and Bridger, 1996; Ashwin, 2006]. It refers to the systematic lay-offs at numerous enterprises

and factories during the first post-Soviet years. The workers were often forced to take administrative leaves without pay, often for several months before an enterprise got an order. While officially people had work, they were actually on leave for many consecutive months which forced many to work unofficially, most commonly selling and reselling some goods. Another manifestation of hidden unemployment was constant salary delays. People had to work without pay for months or sometimes years. At times salaries were even paid in goods and products produced at a given factory e.g. doors, tubes, spare parts etc., which the workers were then supposed to sell themselves at a market.

Hence, later research on unemployment mostly used the statistics calculated by the International Labor Organization. Their methods helped to evaluate that there were no significant differences in unemployment between men and women as shown in Table 2 [Ashwin, 2006; Roshin, 2005; Mezentseva, 2005].

Table 2: Unemployment Level and Gender Structure in Russia According to ILO Methods. Source: Ashwin [2006]; Roshin [2005]; Mezentseva [2005].

Year	**Level of unemployment in %**		**Female ratio among the unemployed in %**
	men	**women**	
1992	5,2	5,2	47,74
1993	5,9	5,8	47,03
1994	8,3	7,9	46,09
1995	9,7	9,2	46,13
1996	10,0	9,3	45,60
1997	12,2	11,5	45,76
1998	13,5	12,9	46,16

Nevertheless, even though women were often discriminated against on the job market, it did not tell significantly on the unemployment level but rather affected the type of employment that women had access to. They often had to lower their expectations for the job search, though some women found this particularly difficult.

2.4 Implications of Work Orientation

In this concern, it is interesting to analyze how women's job orientation preconditioned the level of flexibility they showed on the job market. In this regard, it is important to observe generational differences between women who grew up before and after obligatory labor participation in Russia. Such an attempt was undertaken by Sarah Ashwin, who conducted

a study where she investigated work orientations of men and women, and their ability to adapt to the new Russian market. She singled out three types of work orientation:

1) Professional or commitment to a chosen profession As many previously prestigious professions lost their status, it left those who practiced them feeling betrayed and abandoned. The most common reaction for men and women with professional orientation was a refusal to compromise their professional integrity. Such men and women were ready to accept low wages or long-term joblessness which sometimes led to demoralization. The difference between men and women was that men were more likely to combine a poorly paid but dearly loved profession with an additional job that would bring money. Women in their turn did not have the pressure to be primary breadwinners, and so, Ashwin claims, they were less likely to be shamed for their lower income; hence few women had an additional job.

2) Instrumental, where work is seen as a source of income The adjustment of people with an instrumental approach was more gender-specific. Men still showed a great concern for their status (vertical, horizontal, or expressed though a good wage). Male breadwinners were found to often get an additional employment for the sake of social status. Female breadwinners were mostly driven by the sense of responsibility towards their family. Some female breadwinners saw men as unreliable earners mostly because of the alcohol problems and for this reason they regarded themselves as the pillars of the household. The nature of work women would take and its status was mostly unimportant to them. For this reason, female breadwinners were less likely to take secondary employment. Ashwin argues that in this sense women were more flexible than men.

Instrumental approach was especially well-spread among the younger generation of that time, who were ready to show some great flexibility to get a job. Younger women were found to reject the model of the self-sacrificing Soviet superwoman. They were extremely flexible, compared to their mothers who had been socialized in the USSR. They were ready to search jobs in several fields simultaneously, get additional education or to migrate if necessary. Ashwin argued that a small group of women of a new generation broke the Soviet tradition of marrying young and combining work and family life. Statistics, however, show that these changes were rather insignificant for population trends (see Table 3).

Table 3: Average Age of Men and Women when Registering a Marriage (for those married before the age of 50). Source: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2013/0545/tema02.php.

Year	All marriages			First marriages		
	men	women	difference	men	women	difference
1980	26,29	24,34	1,95	24,28	22,44	1,84
1985	26,53	24,51	2,02	24,16	22,22	1,94
1990	26,14	24,14	2,00	23,93	21,86	2,07
1991	26,18	24,18	2,00	23,95	21,80	2,15
1992	26,21	24,16	2,05	23,87	21,72	2,15
1993	26,13	24,11	2,02	23,83	21,72	2,11
1994	26,32	24,35	1,97	23,98	21,84	2,14
1995	26,59	24,59	2,00	24,18	21,99	2,19
1996	26,85	24,82	2,03	24,41	22,18	2,23
2011	29,74	27,23	2,51	27,38	24,97	2,41

3) Social, where work provides necessary social contact/support Social work orientation was found only among women[4]. These females lacked ambition, structured their work around domestic needs and were concentrated at the lower end of the labor market. They would often refer to their colleagues as their second family.

There was also a small sub-group of young men who tried to avoid working altogether and led their lives focused on their hobbies and interests.

Overall, one can see that work orientation could create certain obstacles in integrating into the new economy for both genders. However, men were less flexible in accepting low status, low-paid jobs and felt more pressure to find additional employment to fulfill their breadwinner contract.

2.5 New Employment and Promotion

This social pressure on men, together with the fact that they were seen as preferable employees, could explain why they would usually find new employment faster than women. For example, in 1993 men needed 4 months and women 5 months to find new employment [Buckley, 1997] Furthermore, the studies have shown that it was much easier for men to find a new job related to their actual skill set while women were often forced to completely change direction [Ashwin, 2006].

[4]Note that this was a qualitative research which is not representative for the general population.

Overall, both genders had to exhibit a high degree of flexibility when looking for new employment in the conditions of market economy. However, men and women were found to display different types of flexibility. Men were very flexible in terms of time: they were ready to work long hours or night shifts. Women were more flexible in the type of work and in the pay they were ready to accept. Females were less likely to have a supplementary job, and even when they did they did not get the same economic benefit from it as men. This fact can also explain why some women were more likely to rely on state resources or on their sponsor/partner/husband's income [Ashwin, 2006].

Already in the Soviet Union women occupied lower status and lower-paid jobs which in the conditions of the post-Soviet crisis became even more visible [National Research Council, 1986]. Many women with higher education had to become cleaners, babysitters or most likely be involved in the street trade. As one sociologist of MCfGS[5] observed: "Everyone sells, everyone trades, whatever they can all the time" [Buckley, 1997]. Women often engaged in street trade to support a particular family need, e.g. children University education [Bridger et al., 1996]. This phenomenon sometimes had the consequence of having too many traders and not enough customers. The state in its turn was hindering illegal trade through occasional fines or bribes while providing no real alternative to people whose survival depended on it.

Well-paid positions were in most cases reserved for men because their work was seen as more efficient and reliable; because they could not get pregnant or presumably did not have to take care of young children; and because they could perform ad hoc physical tasks if needed [Aslanbeigui et al., 1994; Bridger et al., 1996; Wells et al., 2003].

Job offers that women could find in newspapers were primarily low-paid work e.g. subordinate office jobs, home-based informal jobs or prostitution. "Men-only" ads were usually for higher-paid and more prestigious vacancies. Sexism was not the only problem of job-hunting for women; age discrimination was also widespread, limiting the age of applicants to 35, the age above which most unemployed women found themselves. Many female candidates also faced strict requirements concerning personal appearance. More than that, many job advertisements also required female candidates to be unmarried and/or without children [Bridger et al., 1996].

[5]Madison County, Florida Genealogy Society

Job centers often offered women to retrain into some “female” occupations like handwork and traditional crafts, even though the demand for these professions was not exactly high and it would have made much more sense to retrain women in areas which were well-paid and in demand. The emphasis on home-based work was justified by the fact women would be able to combine work and home duties as mothers and housewives [Bridger et al., 1996].

As employment had been obligatory for all under the Soviet regime, unemployment was indeed a new challenge for all. However, women were not as well-prepared to fight over the few available openings and handle professional interviews, having been socialized as noncompetitive and unambitious [Rzhanitsyna, 1993; Bridger et al., 1996].

Furthermore, female socialization was also one of the main reasons why women were less likely to ask for a raise or promotion. Although even when they did, their chances to obtain it were lower. Where women and men had the same level of skills, men would be given a preference. Many women reported being subordinate to men despite their skills and experience [Bridger et al., 1996]. Besides, women had to be more involved in the domestic sphere, spending up to double the time the men did on unpaid domestic work, and they had to leave employment for childbirth, thus losing in skill grading. Once women had children, they experienced great difficulty raising their grading and hence getting a promotion [Khotkina, 1987; Lukina and Nekhoroshkov, 1982; Bridger et al., 1996].

2.6 Starting a Business

Female socialization was also one of the factors that prevented women from starting a business [Buckley, 1997]. Launching a start-up was a risky enterprise as nobody knew exactly how to do it. More than that, doing business in the 1990s meant being involved with organized crime, which was an obligatory attribute of the business world of that time. Women were brought up to be more concerned for personal safety than men and it discouraged them from taking that slippery path.

Extreme corruption was found as another reason that stopped many women from being involved in the business world, as they were afraid of being forced to systematically bribe officials [Bridger et al., 1996]. Additionally, to start a new business one needed capital which for women was more difficult to obtain because of the bias banks had towards them [Barsukova, 1999]. In general, it was commonly considered by Russian people that

women were not fit for such activities, as entrepreneurs had to be willing to take risks and have enough self-confidence.

Many women who still decided to take up business had to fight with negative stereotypes surrounding successful women such as the idea that they neglect their children and husband and damage male sexuality [Bridger et al., 1996]. Women were also expected to open business, if at all, in feminine sectors of economy such as health, culture, education, beauty, public catering or fashion [Buckley, 1997]. Ironically, these expectations were usually met because women had better knowledge and expertise in traditionally female branches. Moreover, such businesses required fewer initial investments; a necessity, given the aforementioned difficulties for them to obtain debt capital [Barsukova, 1999]. Consequently, only few women dared to try to open a business.

2.7 Vertical and Horizontal Occupational Gender Segregation

Considering all the aforementioned difficulties women had at the new job market, there is little wonder that they often found themselves at the bottom of the social and economic food chain. This tendency can be clearly observed in the occupational gender segregation.

In this paper, horizontal segregation is defined as the concentration of males or females in different occupations and vertical segregation as the disproportionate presence of men or women within the hierarchy of occupations. Though the high level of occupational gender segregation is not necessarily a generic indicator of female economic disadvantage, it does reflect the gender cultural norms of a given society and certain discriminatory tendencies [Charles, 2016].

During the Soviet era women were present in some “male” occupations; nevertheless, gender segregation existed even then. Women were concentrated in lower-paid jobs and at lower positions. High management and decision-making positions were reserved to men even in “female” professions. Women were mostly present in such sectors as health, education, service, commerce, textile and public catering; in other words, the occupations that reflected traditional female tasks. The horizontal segregation was even reflected on the level of legislation, as women were forbidden to be involved in certain difficult or dangerous (purely male in this sense) occupations that would endanger their reproductive function.

The main reason for the high level of segregation in the Soviet Union was gender essentialism embedded in the mentality: the idea that biological differences between men and women, such as maternity concerns and physical advantages, make certain professions more suitable for a man or a woman. Similarly, self-selection and skills-atrophy theories trace vertical inequalities back to women's preferences for jobs promising a better reconciliation of family and work (e.g. more flexible and shorter working hours) [Kosyakova et al., 2015].

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to an increase in occupational gender segregation, which was mainly caused by the growing gender stereotypes and lack of market regulations. The main reasons for the reinforcement of traditional gender roles were growing labor market uncertainty, the increasing economic and social value of men, and the introduction of family policies that encourage mothers to withdraw from the labor market. The increase in gender stereotypes might have not only reduced the ambitions of women but also influenced the hiring decisions of employers by preferring men for the higher-status and better-paid jobs [Ogloblin, 1999].

In theory, a service and finance-oriented market economy was supposed to benefit women, who were concentrated in the areas of banking and commerce in the Soviet Union. However, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, as those branches became more lucrative, a growing number of men flocked into these areas, often taking over key management positions and forcing women out into less-profitable occupations [Kosyakova et al., 2015; Roshchin and Zubarevich, 2005; Katz, 2001]. A good example of this is retail trade, which used to be a female occupation. After the collapse, men became the major owners of kiosks and small shops, whereas ad hoc amateur trade of random items or home-grown fruit and vegetables remained a primarily female occupation.

Paradoxically, gender segregation was also the factor that prevented women from complete marginalization during the transition. The general rule of thumb was that the more feminized the occupation was the more chances a woman had to get to the top management positions. For example in financial services there were a number of women who took positions as directors of commercial banks [Domsch et al., 2003].

2.8 Mind the Gap. Income Inequality

As shown in the previous chapter, women were mostly present in lower-paid jobs, so they accordingly earned lower incomes than their male counterparts. The fact that poverty in Russia had a female face is a unanimous opinion among all the authors analyzed. Many women were left with little choice but to work for miserable pay even when they had higher education. Women were found to be as mobile at the market as men and as prepared to retrain, gain additional qualifications and change profession. Nevertheless, they were more likely than men to end up poor with comparable levels of mobility [Ashwin, 2006]. Men were preferable employees, so the only way women could compete and avoid massive unemployment was by devaluating their work. The philosophy of the market economy might have reinforced this process, as only male work was defined as "purely productive" and thus more valuable [Zhurzhenko, 1999]. The Soviet legacy ascribed women their roles as mothers and housewives which in new Russia tangibly decreased their economic and social value, hence increasing the gender wage gap. In 1972–1976 the pay gap comprised 20–25% [McAuley, 1981] and by the beginning of the transition it had increased to almost 30% (see Table 4).

Table 4: Monthly Gender Pay Ratio in Russia. Source: Newell and Reilly [2001].

Year	Ratio
1989	0.709
1992	0.685
1996	0.695

Another factor that disproportionately affected female incomes was inflation. It skyrocketed in the first half of the 90s with prices growing tenfold and social benefits and pensions lagging behind (see Table 5). The problem was that the minimum wage was not being systematically raised in accordance to inflation rates and the consequences of that went far, as the minimum wage was the base to calculate state benefits such as unemployment benefits, child benefits or pensions. Women were the main recipients of state benefits, so their incomes suffered accordingly. These consequences were all the more grieving, considering that most single-parent families were predominantly with single mothers.

Another socially vulnerable category of people suffering from poverty was pensioners, the majority of whom (75%) were women. Female pensioners as a rule received a much

Table 5: Inflation, Wage, Pension (1990-1996). Source: Gordon and Klopov [2000].

Year	Consumer Prices Growth[6]	Average Monthly Wage		Average Monthly Pension	
		Nominal[7]	Real[7]	Nominal[8]	Real[8]
1990	1,0	0,3	100	0,1	100
1991	2,6	0,5	97	0,2	97
1992	67,9	6,0	65	1,6	50
1993	637,9	58,7	65	19,9	66
1994	2041,2	220,4	62	75,5	63
1995	4694,8	472,4	45	188,1	51
1996	5633,8	790,2	48	302,2	56

lower pension than men due to their previous work in lower-paid occupations or job positions. The inflation further reduced the amount of money the elderly got, making it impossible to survive on state benefits alone [Bridger et al., 1996].

Finally, when talking about the lowering female incomes one should not forget the fact that women had the burden of unpaid domestic labor resting on their shoulders. It presented an additional limitation in their choices of employment, and thus incomes, as they had to combine housework with wage work. Furthermore, if the time spent on housework is considered as working time, it can be concluded that the inequality in monetary value of female and male labor grew even bigger than the official numbers could show.

2.9 Gender Division of Domestic Labor

Following the logic of feminist theories on housework [Oakley, 1974; James and Dalla Costa, 1980] the analysis of gender division of domestic labor (hereafter GDDL) is included in the chapter "Women and Work". Domestic labor is normally excluded from monetized work and thus considered to be unproductive by the classic economic theory [Zhurzhenko, 1999]. However, housework can and should be regarded as "proper" work not only due to its social importance but also due to its undeniable economic value. However, the estimation of this value presents a problem. Initially, the following suggestions to put a price on domestic labor were put forward:

1. To estimate how much a hired employee would get for the same work;

[6] X times compared to 1990

[7] Thousands Rubles

[8] % from 1990 level

2. To estimate how much a person responsible for housework could earn instead in accordance with his/her qualifications;

3. To assume that domestic labor does not need any special qualifications and thus evaluate it using minimum wage.

All these methods, however, had serious limitations and were widely criticized for their relativity. For this reason, most researchers prefer to work with time evaluation of domestic labor rather than with monetary evaluation and consider the time budgets of families, i.e. how much time each individual within a family spends on work, domestic labor, physiological needs, leisure activities, etc [Barsukova and Radayev, 2000].[9] All studies found on this topic undoubtedly show that women were considerably more (two/three-fold) involved in domestic labor, no matter what the breadwinner arrangements of the family were. Of course, the situation was not unique for Russia and conformed to a global trend of feminization of domestic labor [Davis and Greenstein, 2004].

However, the unique feature of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia is a so-called "transitional" division of labor, where women became secondary breadwinners and primary housekeepers [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018] in comparison to the traditional division of labor where women are only housewives and do not contribute to the family budget. Sarah Ashwin explains that the transitional division of domestic labor came into being quite early in the Soviet Union through two main factors: first, the Soviet government succeeded in integrating women into the workforce; and second, the lack of exposure to feminist ideas that could explain why the question of male participation in housework has never been raised [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018].

Some sources refer to the increase in the housework burden for women during the period of transition with the rising prices, shortages of goods and collapsing state system of social help [Aslanbeigui et al., 1994; Bridger et al., 1996]. Apart from their usual household tasks, in times of crisis women also had to queue for hours for food and other necessities [Aron, 2002], hand-wash laundry, make and repair clothes and do the paperwork to get state benefits. More than that, often being in charge of the family budget, it was found that women save money on themselves first while protecting their husbands and

[9] Unfortunately, the author of the current work has not found any paper that would present systematic continuous research on the time spent by men and women on housework in the period of transition to chronologically track the increase or decrease of the workload.

children [Rzhanitsyna, 1993]. Besides, under the Soviet system women were the main receivers of state benefits which included housing arrangements, health care, child care, queue-free access to goods and food packages. These privileges quickly disappeared in the new Russia, allegedly increasing the volume of housework for women.

These claims are not, however, supported by any quantitative data. Searching for the number of hours spent respectively by men and women on housework, the author of this thesis has indeed found several quantitative studies on the topic, though almost no longitudinal studies for the period of transition. This fact makes it almost impossible to reliably compare the data presented in different non-longitudinal studies due to the differences in the definitions of "domestic labor/housework" as well as the differences in geographic areas and methods of data collection.

Nevertheless, the author believes it may be enlightening to the reader to present some of these data to form a general idea about the GDDL in the Soviet Union and Russia. One of the often-quoted sources the author has found on the topic is the book "Gender, Work and Wages in the Soviet Union" by Katherina Katz. She compares the data from 1965-68 collected in different Russian cities (Table 6), from 1986 collected in Pskov (Table 7) and from 1989 collected in Taganrog (Table 8).

Table 6: Housework Done by Men and Women in Russian Cities, 1965-68 (hours and minutes per week). Source: Gordon and Klopov [1975].

	women	**men**
Unmarried youths	17.07	5.40
Young spouses	24.25	12.10
Couple with minor children	32.40	12.10
Parents in extended family	30.50	12.15
Single parents	26.15	n.a.
Elderly	29.15	18.00

Table 8 for Taganrog includes working respondents only. For this reason, the difference between time spent on housework for women and men is less than in Tables 6-7. It is nevertheless very large, and although men spent more time in paid work, the total is considerably larger for women in all household types. Comparing Tables 6 and 7, Katz concludes that men increased their share of housework over the 20-year period, but not by very much. She also notes that the striking feature of Table 6 (that the amount of housework done by married men did not increase when they had children) changed over

Table 7: Housework and Paid Work Done by Men and Women in Pskov, 1986 (hours per week). ***Note**: Paid work includes travel to and from work, and housework includes child-care.* Source: Niemi [1991].

	Single, childless		**Married, childless**		**Married, with children of pre-school age**	
	men	**women**	**men**	**women**	**men**	**women**
Paid work	37.1	28.0	42.2	34.7	50.4	29.5
House-work	12.5	23.3	16.0	32.4	18.7	45.2

Table 8: Housework and Paid Work of Working Men and Women in Taganrog, 1989 (hours per week). ***Note**: Paid work includes travel to and from; housework includes childcare, repair and maintenance. "Children" means that there are at present children 16 or younger in the household.* Source: Niemi [1991].

	Single, childless		**Married, childless**		**Married, w/ children**		**Single, w/ children**	
	M	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**	**M**	**W**
Paid work	48	41	48	45	47	45	48	44
House-work	15	27	16	30	23	36	27	35
of which, childcare	0.25	0.4	0.8	0.5	9	10	16	9
N	53	187	132	141	187	247	1	70

time. According to the Taganrog data, working fathers spent almost as much time with their children as working mothers, but the difference in total hours spent on housework is the same for couples with and without children [Katz, 2001]. From these data one can see that the GDDL time gap has decreased over time. The author of the work at hand is still skeptical, however, to what extend one can rely on the comparison of such different data.[10]

Similar data were found in the works of Patrushev and Artemov [Patrushev, 2003; Artemov, 1999]. They compared the time budgets of men and women in Russia in 1986 and 1998/1999, and found that within this period the time women spent on domestic labor in Russia slightly decreased (see Table 9).

However, the authors do not present the continuous annual data for this period, so it might be that there was, in fact, an increase in the domestic labor load at the beginning of the 90s. In another article Patrushev and Artemov actually write that their data collected

[10]Furthermore, there is a relevant longitudinal study of Russian households by the Higher School of Economics from 1992 till now [Kozyreva et al.] which could provide some answers to the GDDL dynamics in the transition period. However, the data must be statistically analyzed, which goes beyond the goals of this thesis.

Table 9: Changes in the Duration of the Main Daily Activities among Working Citizens in Russia from 1986 to 1997/1998 (for each individual in hours per week). Source: Patrushev [2003]; Artemov [1999].

Types of activities	**Men**	**Women**
Work	+1,5	-7,2
Domestic labor and needs	+1,6	-0,1
Physiological needs	-0,3	+4,0
Leisure time	-2,9	+ 3,3

in the 90s showed an increase in time spent on domestic labor for rural population and industry workers in Moscow, while the time spent on paid labor decreased [Patrushev et al., 2001].[11]

Looking into domestic labor, it is also interesting to investigate the money management strategies of Russian families. Here, however, the earliest research the author found was at the end of the period of transition with data collected in 1998 [Clarke, 2002]. The conclusion of this work is that shared money management prevailed in most Russian families of that time, followed by female-dominated money management.[12]

Now, another interesting question about the GDDL is the factors that could lead to a more egalitarian distribution of housework in Russian families. In this concern, it is worth mentioning the latest work of Sarah Ashwin in which she presents the results of a qualitative longitudinal study of Russian households from 1999 to 2010 [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018]. Even though the period she analyzed is later than the timeframe this work is focused on, her results offer interesting insights on how the processes that happened during the transformation might have changed the dynamics of the GDDL in some families. Ashwin comes to the following conclusions:

1. Domestic inequality can be challenged by women's employment and high earnings, but this effect is not automatic and can be blunted by the legacy of Soviet gender ideology that supported women's employment alongside unequal GDDL.

[11] Unfortunately, the authors do not give any details on GDDL and the data on this period are not presented. Nevertheless, these data are available in the archives of Higher School of Economics [Artemov, 1975-2005] which means that the research on GDDL in the period of transition can be easily conducted, though this, once again, goes beyond the goals of this thesis.

[12] No information could be found on whether these dynamics had been different in the Soviet Union and earlier years of the transformation.

2. Having a husband who fully fails his role as breadwinner (which often happened during the transition period) acts as a catalyst of change toward egalitarianism.

3. Having an "egalitarian-leaning" husband in a family who would take an initiative to share the household tasks can enact egalitarian GDDL.

4. "Greater pluralism in terms of gender schemas at a macro level will facilitate an individual's adoption of egalitarian gender ideologies, which in turn will result in less uniform pressure to 'do gender' according to traditional schemas at a micro level, further facilitating the development of egalitarianism among women who discover the availability of men "ready" to share the domestic load" [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018].

In other words, as new gender contracts were formed and numerous men were failing to provide for their families during the transformation, more egalitarian GDDL might have been established in some households.[13]

Overall, it can be concluded that when considering the immediate effects the transformation had on the GDDL, the load of domestic labor was hardly reduced for women(at the very least), which, in the short term, created an additional obstacle in successful female integration into the new capitalist economic system. This new system in its turn changed the socio-economic value of money itself, which further led to the depreciation of care and housework in general.

2.10 The Change of Socio-Economic Value of Money

The change in the socio-economic value of money and the monetization of social relations not only affected housework but also created many other challenges for women in the period of transformation. The essence of this process is that the transition to market economy made money the alternative to, less sole condition of, socio-economic reproduction [Fruchtmann, 2016]. It became the decisive means and measurement of social power. During Soviet socialism it had been merely one means of reproduction amongst others and, what is more, a poorly functioning one. With the introduction of capitalism in Russia, it transformed into

[13]However, there is still an unanswered question on what factors influenced men to become "egalitarian-leaning". Moreover, Ashwin's new findings are still quite hypothetical and thus should be further researched and quantitatively proved.

the ”absolute means” and thus, eventually, a socio-economic end in itself, quite precisely following the social logic Simmel had developed in his “Philosophy of Money” [Simmel, 1978].

As much of the traditional model of the division of labor in families had been conserved during state socialism, the monetization of society implied a severe power shift in gender relations. This change had an impact on the understanding of private and public spheres. It transformed all reproductive labor into a mere subordinate function of wage labor, because “providing for a family” had become a question of money and of money alone. This depreciated care and housework (and all other non-monetary reproductive work traditionally associated with female gender) consequently shifted power towards the earner of monetary income. As the labor law defined women through their reproductive and not economic functions (see Section 2.2), in capitalist system it basically meant that they were economically and thus socially secondary, less significant. Thus, they had more problems than men with finding a decent employment or getting a promotion (see Section 2.5).

Men, in their turn, were preferred employees, so the distribution of socio-economic power between men and women evolved accordingly. Consequently, the restructuring of power dynamics within the society was reflected in the restructuring of vertical and horizontal occupational gender segregation (see Section 2.7). However, if a man could not find an employment, it meant failing his only possible role as a breadwinner and being marginalized by the society. Though, for both genders, being unemployed in the new capitalist world meant not just going against ideology, like it was in the Soviet Union, but risking one’s very existence (see Section 2.3).

The change of socio-economic value of money also had implications for gender contracts (see Section 1.6), as men had even more pressure to earn money, while women turned into token housewives and sex objects, especially (but not exclusively) when they did not have earnings. Likewise, this change probably had an impact on work orientation (see Section 2.4) and can explain why the younger generation mostly had instrumental orientation towards work and not professional or social, which could be viewed as rudiments of the past.

Finally, changes in the meaning of money led to changes in the meaning of networks. Back in the Soviet Union, proximity to power opened an access to state owned resources, privileges and political posts. In post-communist Russia the uppermost value of networks

was that they provided access to sources of income, be it a privatized state company or a position in the government.

2.11 Networks

In Russia getting a work through connections was and still is very common and often preferable. It was estimated that about two-thirds of all jobs in Russia were obtained through contacts [Clarke, 2002; Yakubovich and Ashwin, 2005]. It was especially important to have useful contacts in times of crisis not only to get a better job but also to access necessary goods and services, something that was very common in Soviet Union as well.

Western research on networks showed that a vast majority of men and women received help from the members of their own sex. Gendered networks were one of the ways through which gender job segregation was reproduced [Hanson and Pratt, 1991; Leicht and Marx, 1997; Straits, 1998]

Valery Yakubovich and Sarah Ashwin, however, argued that "in the context of the Russian labour market in the 1990s, women were more effective than men as labour market intermediaries." They found that women were more proactive when helping their relatives, friends, acquaintances and even strangers with the job search. Yakubovich and Ashwin's statistical model proved that a worker was more likely to get a job through a female contact than through a male contact [Yakubovich and Ashwin, 2005]. These findings are consistent with another research that suggested that women got financial help and other forms of material assistance more often than men, with the help coming mostly from other women [Ashwin, 2006]. The phenomena can be explained as a continuity in social female behavior: women transfer their inclination to manage the lives of people from the private sphere to the public one. They would tend to get involved in the lives of colleagues or new acquaintances if they found a way in which they could be helpful, as they would in their family and household. These strong female ties were a part of the Soviet legacy. Household management in the Soviet Union as well as in the period of transition involved a lot of mutual exchange of goods between women. Ashwin and Yakubovich argue that men received help from colleagues one and a half times more often than from family members, while women receive help from the two groups equally often. At the same time, there is evidence that men's networks are less sustaining in periods of distress than women's [Ashwin, 2006].

However, the research also demonstrates that a job from a female contact paid about 12 percent less than one provided by a male contact [Ledeneva, 1998]. As women were concentrated in poorly paid low status jobs, the positions one could obtain through a female contact were mostly from the lower areas of labor market. Men were on the contrary concentrated in the upper layers of job market and were moreover at times more likely to have a direct influence over the process of hiring. This fact explains, for example, why privatization has notoriously passed women by and why new owners of former state companies were mostly men [Chvykalov, 2011]. The same goes for the top influential political posts where women had almost never been present.

3 Politics

3.1 Political Representation

Women in the Soviet government seldomly held important decision-making posts, despite the official egalitarian ideology. There was only 0,5% of women among Soviet ministers and 3% in the Politburo and other departments of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Ayvazova, 1998; Stepanova, 1993]. Quotas for women were established in the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, the highest legislative body, but they comprised only 30%. Gender distribution within any given regulatory body basically represented a pyramid: the more power there was the fewer women there were. The number of female representatives did not differ much on the federal level in comparison with the regional level for a given regulatory body [Ayvazova, 1998; Stepanova, 1993].

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the female quotas were abandoned and a significant drop in female presence in politics was observed. The transformation led to the decrease in the number of women in the legislative bodies from around 30% in the Soviet Union to 15,7% in 1989 and then to 5,7% in the 90s [Kochkina, 1999].

Representation of women in the executive branch also decreased. Since 1990 even if women were present among cabinet members, they were never more than two or three for the high-ranking executive positions. For example, in 1995 among 74 heads of Federal Executive authorities only two were female, and among 35 cabinet members only one. So, by 1995 only 1,4% of senior cabinet members and ministers were female [Kochkina, 1999].

The initial gender structure of the Soviet government predetermined many negative consequences of the transformation for women. On the one hand, as showed earlier, women had never been a significant part of high power government structures. Besides, the mismatch between egalitarian ideology and everyday practice gained its momentum when the structures of social welfare started falling apart, the female quotas were abolished, so a career in politics became less and less attractive to women [Novikova, 1994]. On the other hand, the concentration of men in the high positions of power in the Soviet Union gave them direct access to the state-owned resources and benefits. In the post-Soviet period this translated into the access to state budget and/or means of production, in other words actual money that regained its socio-economic value [Chvykalov, 2011]. Among women, probably only wives or female relatives of newly emerged oligarchs had access to former state wealth on the level comparable to men as they (wives or female relatives) often played a role in resource distribution schemes.

Overall, the end of the Soviet Union led to the decrease of women in politics which in its turn naturally led to fewer policies aimed at the improvement of the female situation in Russia. According to the UN estimations, only when the share of female deputies in a county approaches 30%, can the laws and government programs indeed meet the vital interests of women [Uni, 2011]. As most of the lawmakers in the period of transition in Russia were male, female interests were clearly moved aside as a matter of secondary importance.

Political space, agency and citizenship were found to be strongly gendered in post-Soviet Russia. Interestingly, while masculinity was attributed to institutional politics, femininity in its turn, belonged to civic activity, and these two spheres were represented as distinct from each other. One of the explanations for this separation can be the revived Russian essentialism that reproduced power dynamics of private sphere onto public sphere, where “women were to provide care both in public and in private (in homes, female-dominated care professions, and in civic organizations), while men, in contrast, were to engage in institutional politics and paid work, and to follow the model of a male breadwinner” [Salmenniemi, 2016]. Civic activity was one of the few tools that women in Russia got to oppose the growing inequality and discrimination.

3.2 Female Social Movements and Organizations

For almost seventy years, since 1917 until the late 80s, women's movement in Russia existed mainly within the framework of the country's ideology and under a strict administrative control. It was represented first by the Women's Departments (*Zhenotdeli*) and then by the Women's Councils, (*Zhenskie Soveti*), revived by M. Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. There were also several international organizations, the most famous one was the Committee of Soviet Women. The situation changed in the 90s when a wide range of social female movements and organizations appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union, partially as a counterbalance to the unfortunate situation with female representation in Russian politics (see Figure 2). By 1998 over 600 female associations had been registered by the Ministry of Justice. Most of these organizations were focused on human rights violations [Abubikirova et al., 1998].



Fig. 2: Appearance frequency of women organizations in Russia for the period of 1962-1997. Source: Abubikirova et al. [1998].

Svetlana Ayvasova, one of the most prominent specialists in gender politics in Russia, singled out three periods of development of women's organizations in the period of the transformation: 1989-1992; 1993-1995; 1995-1998 [Ayvazova, 1998].

During the first period (1989-1992), most organizations tried to involve women into active social participation. This task was not easy as many women did not see themselves as a discriminated group. Moreover, in the context of financial crises and the lack of free time it implied, most women were not interested in activism and human rights protection.

So, the primary goal of most women's organizations was to increase the level of female self-awareness.

The second stage was focused on political activism. If at the beginning of their existence most organizations avoided direct interaction with politics, later it became almost unavoidable. Female associations became more and more aware of the urgent necessity to integrate female interests into the new Russian legislation and economic system. These issues were widely discussed at the first and second Independent Women's Forums held in Dubna in 1991 and 1992, as well as at the conference "Women of Russia: From Discrimination to Equal Opportunities", organized by the Union of Women of Russia in late 1992. Most political actors of that time, however, did not see any need to specifically address female issues. None of the 40 political parties of that time included any agenda on women, even though female organizations wrote a letter to every party appealing to change the existing situation.

Nevertheless, when the text of a new constitution was being discussed, female organizations insisted on their active participation in the debates and demanded the inclusion of articles on gender equality, even though the authors of the new constitution were very skeptical about this idea. The result of these negotiations was the inclusion of paragraph 3 of article 19 into the constitution which declares that "the man and the woman shall enjoy equal rights and freedoms and have equal possibilities to exercise them". Additionally, article 7 of the constitution was introduced, that proclaims state support for "the family, motherhood, paternity and childhood", and article 38, which emphasizes that "care for children, their upbringing shall be equally the right and obligation of parents" [The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993]. It was a historic victory for female organizations as they introduced a legal framework within which the fight for gender equality could take place.

Another significant victory of the second phase was the establishment of a female political party "Women of Russia" which managed to get into parliament in 1993 with 8,13% of votes. It was the first time in the history of Russia that women stood up as an independent socio-political force. The parliamentary faction "Women of Russia" began working in the State Duma, having extremely contradictory political visions, in which the protectionist ideas of defending motherhood and childhood were wholly combined with the modernist promises of promoting gender equality in Russia [Ayvazova, 2008]. Even

though, the party failed to be reelected in 1995, mostly due to its ideological inconsistencies, it still managed to put the question of gender equality on the political agenda for several years to come.

The third phase began at the end of 1995 with new parliamentary elections and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing with the participation of Russian female representatives. This phase was focused on the fight against women's rights violations and the search for the new ways and strategies to cooperate with government to solve such problems as domestic violence, rape, child neglect, trafficking of women and children, and the like. It is worth mentioning that as the number of female organization was growing, so were the ideas on what a female movement should focus on. Though, by the end of the transformation, most women's organizations focused on women's rights violations, the end goals of female activism were envisioned very differently by conservative, centrist and liberal groups.

Curiously, the term feminism has a negative connotation in Russian language as it is either associated with totalitarian regime of the USSR or, more often, with the "western" feminism that in minds of many Russians equals "crazy women who hate men." So, there was (and still is) a phenomenon of rejection of the term feminism by many Russian female organizations (even liberal ones), even though their activities definitely fall under the definition of feminism [Klyuchko, 2007; Domsch et al., 2003]. Even in Russian academic research in gender studies "feminism" and "feminist theories" are at times mocked or looked down upon. Here is, for example, an actual quote from a Russian academic article:

> "Feminist ideology considers everything through the prism of demands. [...] Let's hope that it [the research in gender studies] will overcome the infantile disease of feminism and get rid of taboos around male perspective and stops labeling it as 'sexism', 'machismo' and 'traditionalism'." (Barsukova and Radayev [2000])

Regardless of terminology, female activism played an important role in the fight for female rights and equality when it was badly needed. Of course, it did not have enough gravity to drastically improve the situation of women, but at least it represented a force of resistance which gave a solid base for future improvements.



Fig. 1: Introduction of capitalism in Russia. Gender implications. (repeated from page 3)

Conclusion

The history of women's rights in the Soviet Union had its ups and downs but the beginning of the new era and the introduction of capitalism turned into a great burden for Russian women. When exploring the gender aspect of the transformation, most authors mentioned in this work agree that women would disproportionately find themselves among the "losers" of the transition.

To summarize the conclusions of the work at hand and understand the cultural, political and economic implications of the transition for women in the wake of the introduction of capitalism, let us refer to the scheme introduced at the beginning of this work to illustrate its content (see Figure 1).

On the cultural level, the introduction of capitalism and the economic crisis it caused created a cultural and ideological vacuum that was then partially filled by the revived Orthodoxy. Besides, the economic crisis triggered the cultural uncertainty avoidance, that together with the collectivist mentality (which was not yet replaced with the individ-

ualist one) resulted into the renaissance of traditional, pre-communist values that were consolidated by the Orthodox Church; so much so, that people started questioning the very necessity of women to work.

The cultural vacuum created a general state of normlessness, or anomie, which was experienced by both men and women. Old ideologies were mixing with the new, resulting in a diversification of approaches to and interpretations of the morality of the new capitalist system and consumerism.

The state of normlessness also facilitated the reshaping of the female image and female gender contracts. The Soviet contract of "working mothers" evolved into several new contracts, such as "housewife," "career woman," "mistress" [Temkina and Rotkirch, 2002; Nartova, 2008; Zdravomyslova and Temkina, 2003]. However, this diversification did not necessarily have only a negative effect on Russian women as it might have facilitated a shift to a more egalitarian GDDL in the long run [Ashwin and Isupova, 2018]. Anomie turned out to be a greater psychological burden for men rather than for women.

Females, in their turn, were suffering from the increasing sexual violence [Bridger et al., 1996; Johnson, 2009; Pilkington, 1996] as well as sexual objectification in general [Ashwin, 2006; Bridger et al., 1996; Funk and Mueller, 1993]. Sexism and sexual harassment became a commonplace problem for women on the job market. This happened due to anomie on the one hand and commercialization of the female body on the other. Erotica, pornography and prostitution quickly flooded the starved market and inevitably shaped the female image [Pilkington, 1996; Johnson, 2009; Bridger et al., 1996]. It was due to the growing income inequality, that companies started turning female bodies into products and marketing tools. Even women themselves partially started seeing their bodies as goods to be sold as expensively as possible, which can be certainly seen as a form of self-discrimination.

Self-discrimination also facilitated the female acceptance and justification of sexism, unequal GDDL and self-sorting into lower-paid, lower status jobs. The renaissance of the traditional values might have intensified the level of the female self-discrimination.

On the economical level, the transformation and the financial crisis in particular, led to high levels of unemployment, though later studies show that women suffered from it as much as men did [Ashwin, 2006; Tatakovskaya, 2000; Roshin, 2005; Buckley, 1997]. As the necessity for women to work was questioned, Russia's legal system turned women

into second-choice employees [Fischer, 2008; Molyneux, 1990; Gruzdeva et al., 1992], so they were widely discriminated against on the job market [Ashwin, 2006; Bridger et al., 1996; Buckley, 1997; Domsch et al., 2003]. Consequently, women had more difficulties than men in keeping their job, getting a promotion, getting a new employment or starting their own business. Additionally, the female chances on a new job market were sometimes additionally limited by their work orientation, which was formed in the Soviet Union and did not fit the capitalist world. Furthermore, in the private sphere women still had to do a lion's share of housework and thus adjust their employment to their domestic responsibilities. The return to the traditional values might have also put additional pressure on women to behave like "good" housewives. Eventually all these factors resulted into an increase of the wage gap as well as the vertical and horizontal occupational gender segregation [Kosyakova et al., 2015]. Unequal distribution of wealth during privatization [Bridger et al., 1996; Chvykalov, 2011], and the fact that networking in Russia was and still is gender-based, can also account for the economic disadvantages women faced during the period of transition [Ashwin, 2006; Yakubovich and Ashwin, 2005].

A particular emphasis should be placed on the implications of the change in the socio-economic value of money, that was triggered by the introduction of capitalism in Russia. The establishment of money as the decisive means and measurement of social power can account for the increasing instrumental work orientation, and depreciation of female labor. The latter contributed to the direct adoption of the discriminative legislation and thus women faced problems on the job market and in domestic labor. Furthermore, the change in the socio-economic value of money contributed to the formation of new gender contracts. Finally, this change gave a new meaning to networks that would from then on facilitate the access to sources of income and thus sources of socio-economic power, be it a privatized state company or a position in the government.

This brings us to the political level of the transformation. Here, the renaissance of traditional values together with the male initial proximity to power and gendered networks resulted into a significant drop in the female political representation and influence. Despite this, the outraged at discriminations on the job market and the resulting income inequality, women formed numerous female movements and organizations to resist and fight for their rights and freedoms.

This work is an attempt to bridge a theoretical gap in the analysis of gender implications of the system transformation in Russia. However, the academic reflection on this topic is far from being exhausted and it still offers a very rich potential for further research.

Bibliography

Istoriya zhenskogo dvizheniya v rossii. URL http://womenmuseum.ru/encyclopedia/vseso yuznaya-konferenciya-zhenshchin.

Worlds women 2005: Trends and statistics. United Nations, [Place of publication not identified], 2011. ISBN 978-92-1-461033-5.

N. I. Abubikirova, T. A. Klimenkova, Ye. V. Kochkina, and M. A. Regentova. Zhenskiye organizatsii v rossii segodnya. *Spravochnik Zhenskiye nepravitel'stvennyye organizatsii Rossii i SNG*, 1998.

Nancy J. Adler. *International dimensions of organizational behavior*. Thomson/South-Western, Eagan MN, 1997. ISBN 0324360746.

Leon Aron. Structure and context in the study of post-soviet russia: several empirical generalizations in search of a theory. *Demokratizatsiya*, 10(4):429–462., 2002.

V. A. Artemov. Longityudnoye issledovaniye byudzhetov vremeni sel'skogo naseleniya 1975-2005, 1975-2005. URL http://sophist.hse.ru/db/oprview.shtml?en=0&ID_S=1922.

V. A. Artemov. Tendentsii izmeneniya povsednevnoy deyatel'nosti naseleniya v 1970-1990-ye gody: Sotsial'naya trayektoriya reformiruyemoy rossii: Issledovaniya novosibirskoy ekonomiko-sotsiologicheskoy shkoly. *Nauka*, pages 573–593, 1999.

Sarah Ashwin. *Adapting to Russia's new labour market: Gender and employment behaviour / edited by Sarah Ashwin*, volume 5 of *Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe*. Routledge, New York and London, 2006. ISBN 0415349605.

Sarah Ashwin and Elain Bowers. Do russian women want to work. In Mary Buckley, editor, *Post-Soviet women*, pages 21–37. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. ISBN 9780521565301.

Sarah Ashwin and Olga Isupova. Anatomy of a stalled revolution: Processes of reproduction and change in russian women's gender ideologies. *Gender & Society*, 32(4): 441–468, 2018. ISSN 0891-2432. doi: 10.1177/0891243218776309.

Nahid Aslanbeigui, Steven Pressman, and Gale Summerfield. *Women in the age of economic transformation: Gender impact of reforms in post-socialist and developing*

countries / [edited by] Nahid Aslanbeigui, Steven Pressman and Gale Summerfield. Routledge, London, 1994. ISBN 9780415104234.

Svetlana Ayvazova. *Russkiye zhenshchiny v labirinte ravnopraviya*. RDK Rusanova, Moscow, 1998.

Svetlana Ayvazova. *Rossiiskie Vibori: Gendornoe Prochtenie*. Institut sotsiologii RAN, Moscow, 2008.

Svetlana Barsukova. Zhenskoye predprinimatel'stvo: spetsifika i perspektivy. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, (9):75–84, 1999.

Svetlana Barsukova and Vadim Radayev. Legenda o gendere. printsipy raspredeleniya truda mezhdu suprugami v sovremennoy gorodskoy sem'ye. *Mir Rossii. Sotsiologiya. Etnologiya.*, (4), 2000.

Ruth Becker and Beate Kortendiek, editors. *Handbuch Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung: Theorie, Methoden, Empirie*, volume Bd. 35 of *Geschlecht & Gesellschaft*. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2., erw. und aktualisierte aufl. edition, 2008. ISBN 978-3-531-16154-9. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91972-0.

Daniel Bertaux, Anna Rotkirch, and Paul Thompson. *On Living Through Soviet Russia*. Routledge, 2004.

Thoroddur Bjarnason, Thorolfur Thorlindsson, Inga D. Sigfusdottir, and Michael R. Welch. Familial and religious influences on adolescent alcohol use: A multi-level study of students and school communities. *Social Forces, The University of North Carolina Press*, 84(1):375–390, 2005.

Alastair Bonnett. Communists like us. *Ethnicities*, 2(4):435–467, 2016. ISSN 1468-7968. doi: 10.1177/14687968020020040101.

Irena Borowik. Orthodoxy confronting the collapse of communism in post-soviet countries. *Social Compass*, 53(2):267–278, 2016. ISSN 0037-7686. doi: 10.1177/0037768606064339.

Sue Bridger, Kathryn Pinnick, and Rebecca Kay. *No more heroines? Russia, women, and the market / Sue Bridger, Rebecca Kay and Kathryn Pinnick*. Women and politics. Routledge, London, 1996. ISBN 0415124603.

Svend Brinkmann. Interview. In Thomas Teo, editor, *Encyclopedia of critical psychology*, pages 1008–1010. Springer, New York, 2014. ISBN 978-1-4614-5582-0. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7161.

Mary Buckley, editor. *Post-Soviet women: From the Baltic to Central Asia / edited by Mary Buckley*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. ISBN 9780521565301.

Maria Charles. Deciphering sex segregation. *Acta Sociologica*, 46(4):267–287, 2016. ISSN 0001-6993. doi: 10.1177/0001699303464001.

Vasiliy Chvykalov. Gendernaya politika sovetskogo gosudarstva v sotsial'noy sfere v tselyakh zashchity prav zhenshchin. *Yurist-Pravoved*, (3), 2011.

Simon Clarke. Budgetary management in russian households. *Sociology*, 36(3):539–557, 2002. ISSN 0038-0385. doi: 10.1177/0038038502036003003.

Marshall B. Clinard. *Anomie and deviant behavior: A discussion and critique. Marshall B. Clinard, editor*. Free Press and London : Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1964. ISBN 0029055504.

Chris Corrin, editor. *Superwomen and the Double Burden: Women's Experience of Change in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union / edited by Chris Corrin*. 1992. ISBN 1-85727-095-9.

Shannon N. Davis and Theodore N. Greenstein. Cross-national variations in the division of household labor. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 66(5):1260–1271, 2004. ISSN 0022-2445. doi: 10.1111/j.0022-2445.2004.00091.x.

Michel Domsch, Désirée Ladwig, and Eliane Tenten, editors. *Gender equality in Central and Eastern European countries*, volume Bd. 6 of *Forum Personalmanagement, Human Resource Management, 1438-6917*. Peter Lang, New York, 2003. ISBN 3631504047.

Emile Durkheim. *Suicide: a study in sociology*. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1897.

Michael Ellman. The social costs and consequences of the transformation process. *Development and Change*, 27(4), 1996.

R. E. Ericson. Does russia have a "Market Economy"? *East European Politics & Societies*, 15(2):291–319, 2001. ISSN 0888-3254. doi: 10.1177/0888325401015002005.

European Commission. 100 words for equality: A glossary of terms on equality between women and men, 1998.

Donald Filtzer. *Soviet workers and the collapse of perestroika: The Soviet labour process and Gorbachev's reforms, 1985-1991 / Donald Filtzer*, volume 93 of *Cambridge Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet studies*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. ISBN 9780521452922.

Ute Luise Fischer. Transformation: Der systemwechsel und seine erkundung in der frauen- und geschlechterforschung. In Ruth Becker and Beate Kortendiek, editors, *Handbuch Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung*, volume Bd. 35 of *Geschlecht & Gesellschaft*, pages 499–504. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2008. ISBN 978-3-531-16154-9. doi: 10.1007/978-3-531-91972-0{\textunderscore}59.

Guido Friebel. Gender, work and wages in the soviet union: A legacy of discrimination. *The Economics of Transition*, 11(1):199–200, 2003. ISSN 0967-0750. doi: 10.1111/1468-0351.t01-1-00145.

Jakob Fruchtmann. Neoliberalismus, transformation und aberglaube: Der rationalisierungsmythos und die magie des geldes, 2016.

Nanette Funk and Magda Mueller. *Gender politics and post-communism*. Routledge, New York and London, 1993. ISBN 9780415904773.

E. T. Gaĭdar. *Ėkonomika perekhodnogo perioda: Ocherki ėkonomicheskoĭ politiki postkommunisticheskoĭ Rossii, 1998-2002 / [redaktsionnaia kollegiia, E. Gaĭdar (glavnyĭ redaktor) ... i dr.]*. Izd-vo "Delo", Moskva, 2003. ISBN 5774903400.

T. P. Gerber and O. Mayorova. Dynamic gender differences in a post-socialist labor market: Russia, 1991-1997. *Social Forces*, 84(4):2047–2075, 2006. doi: 10.1353/sof.2006.0088.

Pallab Ghosh. Valentina tereshkova: Ussr was 'worried' about women in space. *bbc*, 17.09.2015. URL https://www.bbc.com/russian/uk/2015/09/150917_tereshkova_science_musieum.

Mikhail Gorbachev. *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World. New York:*. Harper & Row, 1987.

Leonid Gordon and Eduard Klopov. Dinamika usloviy i urovnya zhizni naseleniya raznon-apravlennyye tendentsii 90-kh godov). *Monitoring*, (5), 2000.

Leonid A. Gordon and Eduard V. Klopov. *Man after work: Social problems of daily life and leisure time*. Progress Publ, Moscow, 1975.

M. B. Gottesfeld. The worker's paradise lost: The role and status of russian and american women in the workplace. *Comparative Labor Law Journal*, 14(68):86, 1992.

Elena Grusdeva, Ludmila Rzhanitsina, and Zoya Khotkina. Zhenshina na rinke truda. *Obshestvenniie nauki i sovremennost*, (3):178–184, 1992. URL http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/315/161/1217/19-Gruzdeva_i_dr.pdf.

Yelena Gruzdeva, Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna, and Zoya Khotkina. Zhenshchina na rynke truda. *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'*, (3):178–184, 1992.

Catherine Hakim. Developing a sociology for the twenty-first century: Preference theory. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 49(1):137, 1998. ISSN 00071315. doi: 10.2307/591267.

S. Hanson and G. Pratt. Job search and the occupational segregation of women. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, (81):229–253, 1991.

Kathryn Hendley. *Trying to make law matter: Legal reform and labor law in the Soviet Union / Kathryn Hendley*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996. ISBN 9780472106059.

Geert Hofstede. *Masculinity and femininity: The taboo dimension of national cultures*. Sage, 1998.

Geert Hofstede. Dimensionalizing cultures: The hofstede model in context. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1), 2011. ISSN 2307-0919. doi: 10.9707/2307-0919.1014.

Geert H. Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov. *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind : intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival / Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov*. McGraw-Hill, New York and London,

3rd ed. edition, 2010. ISBN 0071664181. URL http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1009/2010010437-d.html.

S. Horne. Domestic violence in russia. *The American psychologist*, 54(1):55–61, 1999.

Human Rights Watch. The human rights watch global report on women's human rights: Discrimination against women workers in russia: Legislative restrictions on women's employment, 1995., 1995. URL https://www.hrw.org/legacy/about/projects/womrep/General-171.

International Labour Organisation. Convention no. 156 convention concerning equal opportunities and equal treatment for men and women workers: Workers with family responsibilities, 1981. URL http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@gender/documents/genericdocument/wcms_114192.pdf.

Selma James and Mariarosa Dalla Costa. *El poder de la mujer y la subversión de la comunidad*. Siglo veintiuno editores, Mexico, 4a ed. edition, 1980. ISBN 9789682304705.

Janet Elise Johnson. *Gender violence in Russia: The politics of feminist intervention / Janet Elise Johnson*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2009. ISBN 9780253220745.

Katarina Katz. *Gender, work and wages in the Soviet Union: A legacy of discrimination / Katarina Katz.* Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001. ISBN 0333734149.

Rebecca Kay. A liberation from emancipation? changing discourses on women's employment in soviet and post-soviet russia. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 18(1):51–72, 2002. ISSN 1352-3279. doi: 10.1080/13523270209696368.

Rebecca Kay. *Gender, equality and difference during and after state socialism*. Studies in central and eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007. ISBN 9780230524842.

Rebecca Kay and Sue Bridger. Gender and generation in the new russian labour market. In Hilary Pilkington, editor, *Gender, generation and identity in contemporary Russia*, pages 21–38. Routledge, London, 1996. ISBN 0415135443.

Oleg Kharkhordin. Oblichat' i litsemerit': genealogiya rossiyskoy lichnosti. *Trudy fakul'teta polit. nauk i sotsiologii*, (5), 2002.

Zoya Khotkina. Problemi zaniatosti zhenshchin v usloviiakh realisatsii kursa na uskorenie sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo rasvitiia strany. In E. Klopov, Elena Grusdeva, and E. Chertikhina, editors, *Trud i vneproizvodstvennaya zhiznedeyatel'nost' zhenshchin rabotnits*. Moscow, 1987.

Zoya Khotkina. : Zhenskaya besrabotitsa i neformalnaya zaniatost v rossii. *Voprosi ekonomiki*, (3):85–93, 2000.

Zoya Khotkina. Equal/unequal opportunities for women with high education in contemporary society and labor market. In Michel Domsch, Désirée Ladwig, and Eliane Tenten, editors, *Gender equality in Central and Eastern European countries*, volume Bd. 6 of *Forum Personalmanagement, Human Resource Management, 1438-6917*, pages 251–268. Peter Lang, New York, 2003. ISBN 3631504047.

Zoya Khotkina, Elena Trofimova, and Natalia Pushkareva, editors. *Zhenshina. Gender. Kultura*. MCGS, Moscow, 1999.

Nadieszda Kizenko. Feminized patriarchy? orthodoxy and gender in post-soviet russia. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 38(3):595–621, 2013. ISSN 0097-9740. doi: 10.1086/668516.

E. Klopov, Elena Grusdeva, and E. Chertikhina, editors. *Trud i vneproizvodstvennaya zhiznedeyatel'nost' zhenshchin rabotnits*. Moscow, 1987.

Ol'ga Klyuchko. Otechestvennyy variant gendernykh issledovaniy (problemy metodologii). *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'*, (4):172–176, 2007.

Elena Kochkina. Zhenshchina v obshchestve: Zhenshchiny v rossiyskikh organakh vlasti*. *Obshchestvennie nauki i sovremennost*, (1), 1999.

Alexandra Kollontai. *Women Workers Struggle for their Rights*. Falling Wall Press, Bristol, 1973.

Alexandra Kollontay. *Polozheniye zhenshchiny v evolyutsii khozyaystva*. Gos. izd-vo, Moscow, 1923.

I. S. Kon and James Riordan. *Sex and Russian society*. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1993. ISBN 025333201X.

Yuliya Kosyakova, Dmitry Kurakin, and Hans-Peter Blossfeld. Horizontal and vertical gender segregation in russia—changes upon labour market entry before and after the collapse of the soviet regime. *European Sociological Review*, 31(5):573–590, 2015. ISSN 0266-7215. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcv060.

Polina Kozyreva, Mikhail Kosolapov, and Barry M. Popkin. Russian longitudinal monitoring survey. URL https://www.hse.ru/en/rlms/.

Olga mname Kuznetsova. , , (persons in prostitution in russia: Typology, stratification, level of violence and abuse). *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2017. ISSN 1556-5068. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3102264.

Gail Warshofsky Lapidus. *Women in Soviet society: Equality, development, and social change*. University of California Press, S.l., 1978 (1979). ISBN 0520039386.

Alena V. Ledeneva. *Russia's economy of favours: Blat, networking and informal exchange*, volume 102. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

K. T. Leicht and J. Marx. The consequences of informal job finding for men and women. *Academy of Management Journal*, (40):967–987, 1997.

Linda L. Lindsey. *Gender Roles: A Sociological Perspective*. Taylor and Francis, Abingdon, Oxon, 6th ed. edition, 2015. ISBN 9780205899685. URL http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=4525491.

Larissa Lissyutkina. Soviet women at the crossroads of perestroika. 1993.

Valentina Lukina and Sergey Nekhoroshkov. *Dinamika sotsial'noy struktury naseleniya SSSR*. Moscow, 1982.

Tatyana Lytkina and Sarah Ashwin. Men in crisis in russia: The role of domestic marginalization. *Gender & Society*, 18(2):189–206, 2004. ISSN 0891-2432. doi: 10.1177/0891243203261263.

Alastair McAuley. *Women's work and wages in the Soviet Union*. Allen & Unwin, London, 1981. ISBN 0-04-339020-X.

Anne McClintock. Family feuds: Gender, nationalism and the family. *Feminist Review*, (44):61, 1993. ISSN 01417789. doi: 10.2307/1395196.

Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat. *Dangerous liaisons: Gender, nations, and postcolonial perspectives / Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat, editors (for the Social Text Collective)*, volume v.11 of *Cultural politics*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis and London, 1997. ISBN 0816626499.

Robert K. Merton. Social structure and anomie. *American sociological review*, 3(5): 672–682, 1938.

Elena Mezentseva. Gender inequality in today russia: Who bear the social costs of reforms? *Gender and Feminism under Post-Communism Roundtable*, Bloomington, IN, 2005.

L. N. Mitrokhin. *Religia i politika w postkomunisticeskoj Rossii*. Izdatielskij Centr Filosofia kultury i religiy, Moscow, 1994.

Maxine Molyneux. The 'woman question' in the age of perestroika. *New Left Review*, (183):23, 1990.

N. A. Nartova. Gendernyy kontrakt sovremennogo rossiyskogo obshchestva i nekonventsional'nyye gendernyye identichnosti. *Zhenshchina v rossiyskom obshchestve*, (3), 2008.

National Research Council. Women's work, men's work: Sex segregation on the job, 1986.

Alexander Naumov and Sheila Puffer. Measuring russian culture using hofstede's dimensions. *Applied Psychology*, 49(4):709–718, 2000. doi: 10.1111/1464-0597.00041.

Andrew Newell and Barry Reilly. The gender pay gap in the transition from communism: Some empirical evidence. *Economic Systems*, 25(4):287–304, 2001. ISSN 09393625. doi: 10.1016/S0939-3625(01)00028-0.

Iiris Niemi. Time use in finland, latvia, lithuania and russia, 1991.

Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic. *Social Change, Gender and Violence: Post-communist and war affected societies*, volume 10 of *Social Indicators Research Series*. Springer, Dordrecht, 2002. ISBN 9789048160631. doi: 10.1007/978-94-015-9872-9. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9872-9.

E. S. Novikova. Zhenshchiny v politicheskoy zhizni rossii. *Preobrazheniye*, (2), 1994. URL http://www.a-z.ru/women/texts/novikovr-e.htm.

Ann Oakley. *The sociology of housework*. Robertson, London, 1974. ISBN 085520074X.

Constantin G. Ogloblin. The gender earnings differential in the russian transition economy. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 52(4):602, 1999. ISSN 00197939. doi: 10.2307/2525066.

Serguei Oushakine. In the state of post-soviet aphasia: Symbolic development in contemporary russia. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52(6):991–1016, 2010. ISSN 0966-8136. doi: 10.1080/09668130050143806.

Gillian Pascall and Nick Manning. Gender and social policy: comparing welfare states in central and eastern europe and the former soviet union. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 10(3), 2000. URL http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/a013497.

Vasiliy Patrushev. Byudzhet vremeni gorodskogo rabotayushchego naseleniya usa i rossii (1980-1990-ye gody). *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, (12):32–39, 2003.

Vasiliy Patrushev, Viktor Artemov, and Ol'ga Novokhatskaya. Izucheniye byudzhetov vremeni v rossii v 20 veke. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, (6):112–120, 2001.

Jane Pilcher and Imelda Whelehan. *Fifty key concepts in gender studies*. SAGE key concepts. SAGE Publications Ltd, London, 2004. ISBN 9781412932073.

Hilary Pilkington. Behind the mask of soviet unity: Realities of women's lives. In Chris Corrin, editor, *Superwomen and the Double Burden*, pages 180–235. 1992. ISBN 1-85727-095-9.

Hilary Pilkington, editor. *Gender, generation and identity in contemporary Russia*. Routledge, London, 1996. ISBN 0415135443.

William Alex Pridemore, Mitchell B. Chamlin, and John K. Cochran. An interrupted time-series analysis of durkheim's social deregulation thesis: The case of the russian federation. *Justice quarterly : JQ*, 24(2):271, 2007. ISSN 0741-8825. doi: 10.1080/07418820701294813.

Natalia Pushkareva. Feminism v rossii, 2014. URL http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/istoriya/FEMINIZM_V_ROSSII.html?page=0,3.

Linda Racioppi. Organizing women before and after the fall: Women's politics in the soviet union and post-soviet russia. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 20 (4):818–850, 1995. ISSN 0097-9740. doi: 10.1086/495023.

Laura Riolli-Saltzman and Victor Savicki. *Gender equality in Eastern Europe: a cross-cultural approach*. 2003.

S. Roshchin and N. Zubarevich. *Gender equality and extension of women rights in Russia in the context of the UN Millenium Development Goals*. INFORES-PRINT, Moscow, 2005.

Sergei Roshin. Gendernoe ravenstvo i rasshirenie prav i vozmoshnostei zhenshin v rossii v kontekste tselii rasvitiia tisiacheletiia, 2005.

Rosstat. Zhenshchiny i muzhchiny rossii, 2016.

Lyudmila Rzhanitsyna, editor. *Rabotayushchiye zhenshchiny v usloviyakh perekhoda Rossii k rynku*. Institut ekonomiki RAN, Moscow, 1993.

Suvi Salmenniemi. Civic activity – feminine activity? *Sociology*, 39(4):735–753, 2016. ISSN 0038-0385. doi: 10.1177/0038038505056030.

Georg Simmel. *The philosophy of money*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston, Mass. and London, 1978. ISBN 0710092059.

Melanie C. Steffens and Ma. Àngels Viladot. *Gender at Work*. Peter Lang US, 2015. ISBN 9781454199779. doi: 10.3726/978-1-4539-1534-9.

N. M. Stepanova. Zhenshchiny v parlamente: roskosh' ili neobkhodimost'? *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'*, (5):44–53, 1993.

B. C. Straits. Occupational sex segregation: The role of personal ties. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, (52):191–207, 1998.

Irina Tatakovskaya. Gendernie aspekti strategii bezrabotnih. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, (11):73–82, 2000.

Anna Temkina and Anna Rotkirch. Sovetskie gendernie kontrakti i ih transformatsiia v sovremennoi rossii. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, (11):4–14, 2002.

Thomas Teo, editor. *Encyclopedia of critical psychology*. Springer, New York, 2014. ISBN 978-1-4614-5582-0. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993. URL http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm.

Thorolfur Thorlindsson and Jon Gunnar Bernburg. Durkheim's theory of social order and deviance: A multi-level test. *European Sociological Review, Oxford University Press*, 20(4):271–285, 2004.

Trudovoi Kodeks RF. Zakon RF ot 19.04.1991 N 1032-1 (red ot. 29.07.2017) O zaniatosti naseleniya v RF, 1991.

Timo Vihavainen and Evgenij Kimovič Hejskanen. *Aleksandra Kollontaj i Finlândiâ: Doklady naučnogo seminara*, volume 29 of *Publicaciones del Instituto Renvall*. Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki, op. 2010. ISBN 9521067551.

Betty L. Wells, Tamara J. Pfantz, and Jennifer L. Bryne. Russian women business owners: Evidence of entrepreneurship in a transition economy. *Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship;*, 8(1):59–71, 2003.

Valery Yakubovich. Weak ties, information, and influence: How workers find jobs in a local russian labor market. *American Sociological Review*, 70(3):408–421, 2016. ISSN 0003-1224. doi: 10.1177/000312240507000303.

Valery Yakubovich and Sarah Ashwin. Cherchez la femme: Women as supporting actors in the russian labour market. *European Sociological Review*, 21(2):149–164, 2005. doi: 10.1093/esr/jci010.

Nira Yuval-Davis, Floya Anthias, and J. Campling. *Woman-Nation-State*. New York, 1989.

Sergei Zaharov. Sredniy vozrast zhenikhov i nevest uvelichivayetsya, 2013.

Lyudmila Zavadskaya. Gendernaya ekspertiza rossiyskogo zakonodatel'stva, 2001. URL http://www.owl.ru/win/books/zavadskaya/2.htm.

E. A. Zdravomyslova and A. A. Temkina. Transformatsiya gendernogo grazhdanstva v sovremennoy rossii. *Kuda prishla Rossiya*, pages 140–150, 2003.

Yelena Zdravomyslova, Anna Rotkirkh, and A. Tomkina. Sozdaniye privatnosti kak sfery zaboty, lyubvi i nayemnogo truda: Novyy byt v sovremennoy rossii: gendernyye issledovaniya povsednevnosti. *Kollektivnaya monografiya*, (11), 2009.

Clara Zetkin. *Erinnerungen an Lenin*, volume 17 of *Edition 100 bei ISP*. Neuer ISP-Verl., Köln, 1. aufl. edition, 1925. ISBN 3929008173.

Ruohui Zhao and Liqun Cao. Social change and anomie: A cross-national study. *Social Forces, The University of North Carolina Press*, 88(3):1209–1229, 2010.

Tat'yana Zhurzhenko. Analiz polozheniya zhenshchin v perekhodnoy ekonomike: v poiskakh feministskoy epistemologii. *Zhenshchina. Gender. Kul'tura*, pages 160–170, 1999.

List of Tables

List of Figures

Universität Bremen

Diese Erklärungen sind in jedes Exemplar der Bachelor- bzw. Masterarbeit mit einzubinden.

Name: _____ Matrikelnr.: _____

Urheberrechtliche Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe.
Alle Stellen, die ich wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus anderen Werken entnommen habe, habe ich unter Angabe der Quellen als solche kenntlich gemacht.

Datum Unterschrift

Erklärung zur Veröffentlichung von Abschlussarbeiten

Die Abschlussarbeit wird zwei Jahre nach Studienabschluss dem Archiv der Universität Bremen zur dauerhaften Archivierung angeboten.
Archiviert werden:

1) Masterarbeiten mit lokalem oder regionalem Bezug sowie pro Studienfach und Studienjahr 10 % aller Abschlussarbeiten
2) Bachelorarbeiten des jeweils der ersten und letzten Bachelorabschlusses pro Studienfach und Jahr.

◉ Ich bin damit einverstanden, dass meine Abschlussarbeit im Universitätsarchiv für wissenschaftliche Zwecke von Dritten eingesehen werden darf.

○ Ich bin damit einverstanden, dass meine Abschlussarbeit nach 30 Jahren (gem. §7 Abs. 2 BremArchivG) im Universitätsarchiv für wissenschaftliche Zwecke von Dritten eingesehen werden darf.

○ Ich bin nicht damit einverstanden, dass meine Abschlussarbeit im Universitätsarchiv für wissenschaftliche Zwecke von Dritten eingesehen werden darf.

Datum Unterschrift